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TAXPAYER'S PARADISE IN THE CARIBBEAN
ROBERT M. BAKER* and JAMES E. CURRY**
A new inddstrial tax exemption statute became law in Puerto Rico on
May 12, 1947.1 This island possession of the United States, located eight
hours away from New York's LaGuardia field is already free of all federal
income taxation. In the past, this favorable factor in its competition with
mainland communities has been offset to a large extent by a very heavy local
income tax. But industrialists who operate under the new exemption will be
free of both federal and insular income taxes, as well as property and other
local taxes.
Puerto Rico is closer, in terms of transportation costs, to the seaboard
cities of the United States, with more than half of the nation's buying power,
than is Pittsburgh or St. Louis.1 a The temperature in Puerto Rico on the
coast varies between a mean winter temperature of 73.40 Fahrenheit and a
mean summer temperature of 78.90, with temperatures from 5 to 10 degrees
lower in the mountains. Heating of homes is unknown and construction and
clothing costs relatively low. These savings naturally reduce laborcosts.lb
The new generation of grammar school graduates speak and understand English. Yet, with all these advantages, few industrial or commercial enterprises
have been launched in Puerto Rico. The tradition of an agricultural colonial
economy and the lack of mechanical training among the people of the island
are largely responsible for this reluctance of investors. A growing awareness
that the island must industrialize or starve"- has led the Insular Government
to make strenuous efforts to encourage investors. An intensive vocational
training program and the promise of tax exemption are the two main features
of this appeal to industry.
A substantial development of industry may well be anticipated in response to this appeal. To date, 49 applications have been received from manufacturers of buttons, canned goods, rainwear, eyedroppers, coconut concentrates, pastry fillers, multigraphing, embroidered blouses, milk bottle caps,
* Member of the District of Columbia Bar; Special Secretary for Tax Exemption
of Puerto Rico.
** Of Curry, Cohen & Bingham; Member of the Bar of the District of Columbia
and of Puerto Rico.
1. Laws of Puerto Rico (1947), Act. No. 346, approved May 12, 1947, as amended
by Act No. 22 of December 5, 1947. The amendment increased the basic period of exemption from ten to fifteen years and also exempted from taxation the transfer of the assets
of an exempt subsidiary of its parent corporation.
la. F. S. Cohen, Science and Politics in Plans for Puerto Rico, 3 Journal of Social
Issues 6, 13 (1947).
lb. The Puerto Rico Handbook reviews (at p. 32) minimum wage rates established
in Puerto Rico under a special exemption contained in the Federal Wage and Hour Law.
They run as low as fifteen cents an hour as compared to the universal minimum of 40
cents per hour in the States.
1c. Puerto Rico Handbook (Office of Information for Puerto Rico) p. 6.
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ice cream cones and soda straws, gloves and polished, diamonds. None have
been rejected. Applications have been granted for manufacturers of. candy,
furniture, chinaware and brassieres.
Previous tax exemption laws in the United States have not been so successful in attracting new industry as fully to justify the hopes of their sponsors. But tax exemption as used in the economic warfare between communities in the past, may be compared to the new Puerto Rican law only as older
weapons of international warfare may be compared to the atomic bomb.
SCOPE OF THE EXEMPTION

The purpose of this Act (No. 346), as stated in its preamble, is "to
define new industries in Puerto Rico; to protect same by temporary tax

exemption." Legislation with a similar purpose had previously been enacted
in Puerto Rico, 2 but the scope of the present statute is much wider'thafi that
of its predecessors.
The new law provides that the Executive Council of Puerto Rico, with
the Governor's approval, shall grant "temporary exemption from property
and income taxes, and from excise, license, or other' municipal taxes" to applicants who prove "to the satisfaction of the Executive Council that the applicant has established or will establish a new industry in Puerto Rico." The
exemption extends to all property, income, and activities connected with the
exploitation of the new industry. It is a total exemption until June 30, 1959,
after which date, three years of partial exemption (75%, 50%, and
25%) are provided. All exemption expires after June 30, 1962 unless further
extended by the Legislature.
The full impact of the Act is found in the definition of "new industry."
The predecessor statute of 1936 3 had defined the term as follows:
"For the purposes of this Act, new industry shall be understood to be all such
methods of processing and manufacture, either by hand or by machinery, as by transforming raw material, shall have as their object the production of articles of commerce never before produced in Puerto Rico; Prozided, That such processed or
manufactured products, properly finished, as may be utilized in connection with
such industries, shall not be considered as raw material."
Act No. 346 follows this definition in part, but expands it and makes its
coverage more specific. "New industry" is to be understood "to be all such
methods of processing and manufacture, either by hand or by machinery, as

shall, by transforming raw material, have as their object the production, in
2. Act No. 92, promulgated March 13, 1919, as amended by Act No. 16, approved
May 20, 1925; Act No. 40, approved April 25, 1930; Act No. 94, approved May 14, 1936.
3. Act No. 94, approved May 14, 1936, § 2. This definition is substantially the same as
that found in Act No. 40, approved April 25, 1930, § 1, with the addition of the limiting
proviso.
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Ptierto Rico," of articles of commerce within any of three named categories:
First: Such articles as have been produced in Puerto Rico since January
2, 1945 by industries qualified for exemption under the exemption law
of 1936, 4 but which had not applied therefor nor had an application
pending on March 29, 1947. This category is presumably a fairly limited
one.
Second: "Articles of commerce which were not in production in Puerto
Rico in commercial scale on January 2, 1947, and for the production of
which there was not, on that date, any factory establishment, or any
other organization."
Third: Any of a long list of enumerated articles. 5
The inclusion of many of these items in the definition of "new industry"
involves an unprecedented expansion of the scope of the term, for a number
of them have been in commercial production in the island for some time. Under specified conditions these old industries will likewise be entitled to the
"new industry" exemption. Regarding previously established plants the
Legislature further provided that no plant which produced, or could have
produced, any of the enumerated articles in the two months preceding January 2, 1947, would, solely on that account, be entitled to an exemption, until
such an exemption is granted to some person who "establishes in Puerto Rico
in good faith, in the judgment of the Executive Council, after the date of the
approval of this Act, industrial facilities for the production of such articles
in commercial scale." When newly created establishments qualify for tax
exemption older firms in the same line of business will immediately be qualified for an equivalent exemption.6 This result is indicated also by the express
4. See note 3 supra.
5. The articles enumerated are: (1) fishing tackle, including nets and rods; (2)
pottery; (3) articles of straw, reed, and other fibers; (4) rugs; (5) bonbons; (6) shoes;
(7) caramels; (8) ceramics, including bricks, tiles, sanitary supplies, and other 'clay
products; (9) preserved citron; (10) cigarettes; (11) cigars; (12) bed springs; (13) slippers; (14) toys; (15) cosmetics; (16) glassware; (17) cotton, silk, or rayon hosiery;
(18) fine cardboard and paper pulp; (19) soaps; (20) tin containers; (21) water and
oil paints; (22) tannery products; (23) polishing of diamonds and of other precious and
semi-precious stones; (24) crackers; (25) canned products; (26) gloves and billfolds;
(27) construction of coach or bodies of motor vehicles; (28) furniture manufacture; (29)
food pastes; (30) vegetable oils; (31) balls for baseball and other sports; (32) embroidery; (33) matches; (34) mattresses; (35) preserved fruits; (36) articles produced
by assembly plants. By assembly plants shall be understood those factories engaged in
the production of articles of commerce, excluding furniture, by putting together the parts,
provided the cost of the work of assembling the article represents such a substantial
part of the total cost of the article that in the opinion of the Executive Council the industry deserves the exemption herein provided; (37) cheese; (38) artificial flowers; (39)
production of cinematographic jobs in motion pictures exhibited for commercial purposes;
(40) production of fiber from coconut and other fibrous plants, and the products derived
therefrom; (41) candles.
6. In this respect the Puerto Rican statute is somewhat unique. Most "new industry"
tax exemptions apply only to enterprises to be established subsequently to the effective
date of the enacting statute. See Baugh, Kennedy & Co. v. Ryan, 51 Ala. 212 (1874) ;
Yocona Cotton Mills v. Duke, 71 Miss. 790, 15 So. 929 (1894) ; Victor Cotton Oil Co. v.
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provision that enjoyment of tax exemption under Act No: 94, approved May
14, 1936, "shall"not prevent the application for, and obtention of, tax exemptions in accordance with the provisions hereof." 7 Very properly there will
be no grant of a competitive advantage to a new firm as against an older one
in the same line of business. However it is not the problem of competition
with insular plants that is of importance from the viewpoint of manufacturers
now operating in the continent. Rather, it is the tremendous competitive advantage that the migrant industrialist, in common with those already established in Puert6 Rico, will have over stay-at-home competitors on the continent.
ADMINISTRATIVE PROVISIONS

In anticipation of the administrative and legal problem whether an applicant is within the definition of "new industry," the statute provides that
the Executive Council (the Governor's cabinet) "shall hold such public hearings as it may deem pertinent." 8 Such hearings before the Special Secretary
for Tax Exemption (or a special master) are to be held where "warranted
on the basis of the information presented by the petitioner," after notice to
all parties and "bygeneral publication.9 In the determination of each petition,
the Executive Council is required to consider reports made thereon by the
Industrial Development Company of Puerto Rico and the Development Bank
of Puerto Rico (both governmental corporations) and the Puerto Rico Planning, Urbanizing, and Zoning Board.' 0 '
Where a hearing is held, the Council also is to consider "the evidence
adduced at the hearing ...and the report and recommendation of the Special
Secretary or the special master." 11 The law provides that "in cases in which
it appears from the information presented by the petitioner in the petition and
accompanying documents that the industry for which he is seeking tax
exemption does not qualify under the terms of Act No. 346, the Executive
Council and the Governor may disapprove the petition without the holding of
a public hearing," but only after considering the reports of the three specified
Louisville, 149 Ky. 149, 148 S. W. 10 (1912); expressly overruling Mengel Box Co. v.
Louisville, 117 Ky. 735, 79 S.W. 255 (1904). Under this rule, it has been held that a new
manufacturing plant built after a previously existing one had been totally destroyed by fire,
was not within a "new industry" tax exemption: Morris v. Riley, 135 Miss. 1, 99 So. 466
(1924). Contra: Rixford Mfg. Co. v. Highgate, 102 Vt. 1, 144 Atl. 680 (1929) where the
former plant was destroyed by flood.

7. § 7.

8. § 5 (2).
9. Regulations for Tax Exemption for New Industries, promulgated by the Executive
Council of Puerto Rico on July 30, 1947 (hereinafter cited as Regulations) § 7.

10. § 4 (5) proviso; Regulations, § 8. These reports are to be rendered by the agen-

cies named within 15 days after receipt of a copy of the petition-from the Special Secretary: Regulations, § 6.

11. Regulations, § 8.
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agencies. 12 Thus, the technical expertise of the existing interested administrative bodies will be available to the Council in reaching individual decisions.
The present act is far more sweeping than its predecessors in aspects
other than the definition of "new industry." The 1936 statute, for example,
excluded assembly plants from its operation by a limiting proviso in its definition of "new industry," while the present act specifically includes such enterprises. That act, furthermore, authorized the Public Service Commission
to prescribe the period of exemption, not to exceed ten years, whereas the
present act specifies a temporal duration applicable to all beneficiaries. Thirdly, the 1936 statute expressly excluded income taxes from the exemption,
while the present act expressly includes them. And, lastly, Section 5 of the
former law worked a severe limitation completely antithetical to the provisions
of the present one:
"When an industry has been acknowledged as new in Puerto Rico and the exemption provided by this Act has been granted to it, tax exemption shall not be granted
to any other similar industry established thereafter."
The 1919, 1925 and 1930 laws were of substantially the same limited application as compared to the present enactment.
PURPOSES OF THE AcT

The purpose of this legislation is fairly obvious. The temporary industrial conditions of wartime under which Puerto Ricans were comparatively
well occupied and comparatively well paid are largely dissolving into the
more permanent features of the Puerto Rican economy. 13 The most striking
characteristics of that economy have long been the dominance of sugar production, 14 and the prevalence of widespread unemployment.Xr Puerto Rico
has been called a financial liability to the United States, for she is not required
to contribute directly by way of federal taxes to the support of the Federal
Government, yet does receive considerable federal financial assistance of

12. Regulations, § 8.

13. The Puerto Rican economy has been termed "an economy of colonial exploitation,"
by Senator Vicente Geigel Polanco, floor leader of the Popular Democratic Party of the
Puerto Rican Senate. 79th Cong., 1st Session, Senate Committee on Territorial and
Insular Affairs, Hearings on S. 227, Inzdependence for Puerto Rico, 46 (1945). See in
accord, DIFFIE, PORTO Rico: A BROKEN PLEDGE (1931).
Descriptive surveys of this economy may be found in the Office of Information for
Puerto Rico, PuERTo Rico HANDBOOK (1947) ; U. S. Tariff Commission, The Economy of
Puerto Rico (1946); and Puerto Rico Department of Agriculture and Commerce, Puerto

Rico, Industrialand Commercial (1941).

14. Puerto Rico Department of Agriculture and Commerce, What Sugar Mcans to
Puerto Rico (1940); GAYER, TE SUGAR EcONOMY OF PUERTO Rico (1938). See also
DIFFIE, op. cit. supra n. 13, ch. IV, concluding that, as of 1931, "'Sugar Economy' has
proved to be 'bad economy' for Porto Rico." (p. 88).
15. De Golia, Puetrto Rico: What It Produces and What It Buys, U. S. Dept. of
Commerce, TRADE INFO. BuLL. No. 785, 11 (1932), reports that there is an "average unemployment of about 40 per cent of the working population of the island." The situation
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various types just as do the states. Her citizens are exempt from the federal
income tax and customs duties are collected but turned over to the local gov7
ernment for internal use.'
The encouragement of industry by means of the new tax exemption law
8
is thus directed primarily toward solution of the unemployment problem,'
and indirectly at diversification of the Puerto Rican economy, lessening
financial dependence upon the United States, and decreasing the magnitude
of imports from the United States, most necessities of life being purchased
at tariff-protected American prices. 19
CONSTITUTIONAL VALIDITY

Industrial tax exemption laws occupy a rather anomalous position in
the framework of constitutional law.20 Direct subsidization of private inis referred to in terms of Puerto Rico's "chronic unemployed army" by the insular Commissioner of Labor: Puerto Rico Dept. of Labor, Annual Report for 1941-42, 10. See
infra n. 152.
An obvious clue to the motive behind Act No. 346 is found in the statement of this
same official in ibid., 1939-40, p. 52: "The huge availability of low-cost labor in Puerto
Rico would seem a most important factor for the expansion of the industries already
existing in our country or introduction of new ones. In fact,, however, our industrial
activities along new lines of enterprise have had a tardy increment in recent years, despite
strenuous efforts on the part of our insular authorities to attract more capital investments
towards industrializing our Island."
16. U. S. Tariff Commission, op. cit., supra n. 13, p. 11 et seq.; ROOSEVELT, COLONIAL
POLICIES OF THE UNITED STATES, 107 (1937). Senator Ellender of Louisiana, addressing
a Puerto Rican witness, 78th Cong., 1st Session, Senate Committee on Territorial and
Insular Affairs, Hearings on S. 952, Puerto Rico, 196 (1943), stated, "In the period 1933
to 1941 the Federal Government spent for relief and for grants to Puerto Rico over
$300,000,000, or a total of $37,500,000 per year. Now, you have obtained that sum out of
the Federal Treasury without having put up one red cent in return." This, of course, does
not take account of indirect contributions of Puerto Rico to the Federal Treasury, as for
example, in the income or profit taxes of continental residents investing in insular industries.
17. ORGANIC ACT, 39 STAT. 954 (1917), 48 U. S. C. § 734; 31 STAT. 78 (1900), 48
U. S. C. § 740; INT. REv. CODE, § 3360 (c).
18. See statements of Dr. BIas Herrero, member of the Puerto Rican Senate, Hearings on S. 952, cited supra n. 16, p. 152 et seq., and testimony of Hon. Bolivar Pagan,
Resident Commissioner of Puerto Rico to the United States, ibid., p. 239 et seq. The Department of Labor of Puerto Rico has attempted to assist in industrial expansion and
location by means of vocational training programs to supply skilled workers: Puerto
Rico Dept. of Labor, Annual Report, 1936-37, 10-12.
19. Hearings on S. 227, cited supra n. 13, 46-47, 72, 398 et seq.; Hearings on S. 952,
cited, supra n. 16, 327-8.
Basically, these problems are only phases of the larger chronic problem of trying to
raise the standard of living, which has long been, in general, a meager one in Puerto Rico.
HANSON AND PEREZ, INCOMES AND EXPENDITURES OF WAGE EARNERS IN PUERTO Rico

(1947) contains a detailed statistical treatment of these facts.
A long continued program to stimulate industrialization, through both public and
private agencies, has been regarded by many as fundamental to any solution: TUGWELL,
THE STRICtEN LAND, 254-55 (1946); TUGWELL, PUERTO RICAN PuBLIc PAPERS, 58-60,
170-72, 231-33 (1945) ; F. S. Cohen, Science and Politics in Plans for Pterto Rico, 3 Jour.
of Social Issues (1947) ; Office of Information for Puerto Rico, Puerto Rican Handbook,
30 (1947) ; U. S. Tariff Commission, The Economy of Puerto Rico, 26 et seq. (1946) ;
Puerto Rico Department of Agriculture and Commerce, Puerto Rico, Industrial and Coininercial (1938), id. (1941).
20. See Stimson, The Exemption of Property front Taxation in the United,States,
18 MINN. L. Rav. 413, 419 (1934).
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dustry with money collected through taxation is clearly improper. 21 But when
22
the subsidy takes the form of a tax exemption, it is generally upheld.
It is common learning that taxation must be for a direct public purpose,
and that if it is not for such a purpose, due process of law is wanting. As
stated by Day, J., in Green v. Frazier,253 U. S. 233, 238 (1920):
"The due process of law clause contains no specific limitation upon the right of taxation in the States, but it has come to be settled that the authority of the states to
tax does not include the right to impose taxes for merely private purposes."
Under this rule, public donations to assist in establishing private industrial
23
enterprises are not for a public purpose, and are therefore unconstitutional.
A few courts have acknowledged that an industrial tax exemption is, in
24
economic effect, a form of subsidy and should be subject to the same test.
In Eyers Woolen Co. v. Gilsuin, 84 N.H. 1, 146 AtI. 511, 64 A.L.R. 1196
(1929), the court holds that a special exemption given by statute to a specific
woolen mill is not for a "public purpose" and hence is void, stating (at
p. 9 of 84 N.H.) that this exemption "gives the town's money to the plaintiff
as effectively as would a direct appropriation of the sum involved." 25
An even more emphatic statement is found in Brewer Brick Co. v. Town
of Brewer, 62 Me. 62, 72, 16 Am. Rep. 395 (1873):
"It is conceded in the argument that towns and cities cannot constitutionally be
authorized to raise by taxation money to be given away ....

But the remission

of a tax by a vote of the town is in substance and effect a gift. What matters it to
the plaintiffs or the defendants whether the town votes to give $309.75 to the
plaintiffs, or to exempt their property from its just and proportional tax, and assess
the amount of such exemption upon the remaining estate liable to taxation? It is
a gift."
However, the leading case of Crafts v. Ray, 22 R.I. 179, 46 Ati. 1043,
49 L.R.A. 604 (1900) comes to a different conclusion. Two specific firms
had been exempted for ten years by a town vote subsequently ratified by the
Rhode Island General Assembly. An argument similar to the one above
quoted was made but (at p. 189 of 22 R.I.) was refuted most emphatically:
21. See cases cited infra n. 23.
22. See cases cited infra n. 26.
23. Loan Assn. v. Topeka, 20 Wall. 655 (U. S. 1875) (shops to manufacture iron
bridges); Ferrell v. Doak, 152 Tenn. 88, 275 S. W. 29 (1924) (box factory) ; Minnesota
Sugar Co. v. Iverson, 91 Minn. 30, 97 N. W. 454 (1903) (sugar mills) ; Clee v. Sanders,
74 Mich. 692, 42 N. W. 154 (1889) (stave mill); English v. People, 96 Ill. 566 (1880)
(rolling mill); Weismer v. Douglas, 64 N. Y. 91 (1876) (lumber mill).
24. Stimson, The Stiimulation of Industry Through Tax Exemption, 11 Tiss TAX
MAGAZINE, 221, 222 (1933); Baker, Tax Exemption Statutes, 7 TEX. L. REv. 50, 60
(1928).
25. To the same effect, see State v. Company, 60 N. H. 219, 251 (1880) and Canaan
v. District, 74 N. H. 517, 70 AtI. 250 (1908).
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"It is argued that the exemption in this case is equivalent to taking a taxpayer's
money, and giving it to the manufacturer. It is not quite that. The theory of the
transaction is that a public benefit will accrue to the town and its inhabitants by
the introduction of the business enterprise, equivalent to an exemption from taxes
for a certain time, and on this ground it is offered. . . . The property of a town is
benefited, both in value and income, by the introduction of business, and the consequent increase of inhabitants. When, therefore, one erects a factory under a contract
of exemption, the consideration for which is an expected public benefit, the case is
quite different from that of a pure gift."
The generally prevailing rule, it seems, is that, where not forbidden by
constitutional prohibition, the legislature may validly exempt new industries
26
in general from taxation. In Duke Power Co. v. Bell, 156 S.C. 299, 152 So.
7
865 (1930), for example, the court was called upon to construe a statute0
granting a five year exemption from county taxes to new "manufactories."
The state constitution (article 10, section 1) authorized exemptions of property "for municipal purposes." It was held that the statute was valid as being
for a "municipal purpose," that is, "a public or governmental purpose as
distinguished from a private purpose." 28
The legislature's exercise of its power to exempt property from taxation
must not be arbitrary, but must be founded upon some principle of public
policy which will support the, presumption that the public interest will be
29
served by the exemption.
Attacks against industrial exemption laws have been made under several
differing constitutional phraseologies. A

number of state constitutions re-

quire "uniformity" and/or "equality" in taxation, for example. The leading

case of Wisconsin C.R. Co. v. Taylor County, 52 Wis. 37, 8 N.W. 833 (1881)
expounds the accepted doctrine, after an exhaustive survey of earlier authority.3 0 The state Constitution (art. 8, §1) said that, "The rule of taxation

shall be uniform." The conclusion of the court (at p. 95 of 52 Wis.) was
that:
"Taxes can only be levied upon such property as the legislature shall prescribe, and
then only by a uniform rule, but it is the 'rule,' and not the property, which the
constitution thus requires to be 'uniform.' The legislature not only has the power to
26. Crow v. General Cable Corp., 223 Ala. 611, 137 So. 657 (1931); Duke Power
Go. v. Bell, 156 S. C. 299, 152 S. E. 865 (1930); Williams v. Baldridge, 48 Idaho 618,
284 Pac. 203 (1930); State v. Elba Bank & Trust Co., 18 Ala. App. 253, 91 So. 917
(1921) ; In Re Auditor General, 199 Mich. 489, 165 N. W. 771 (1917).
27. 34 SOUTH CAROLiNA STATUTEs AT LARGE 891 (1925).
28. From syllabus, 156 S. C. at p. 301.
29. Miller v. Lamar Life Ins. Co., 158 Miss. 753, 131 So. 282 (1931) ; Harkin v. Bd.
of Commrs., 30 Wyo. 455, 222 Pac. 35 (1924); State v. Snyder, 29 Wyo. 199, 212 Pac.
771 (1923).
30. Accord, People v. The Auditor, 7 Mich. 84 (1859), where, under a constitutional
provision (art 14, § 11) stating, "the legislature shall provide a uniform rule of taxation,"
it was held that "this provision of the constitution has no reference to the power to
exempt or remit taxes." (7 Mich. at p. 90). See also, State v. Collins, 43 N. J. L. 562

(1881).
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-prescribe the property to be taxed, but the rule by which it is to be taxed; and the
only limitation upon that power is that the rule so prescribed shall be uniform. The
power to prescribe what property shall be taxed necessarily implies the power to
prescribe what property shall be exempt."

A similar theory has been developed elsewhere under similar or more
stringent constitutional language. Under a provision 3 ' stating that "taxation
shall be equal and uniform thoughout the state," it was held in New Orleans
v. Fourchy, 30 La. 4nn. 910 (1878) that an exemption was valid, on the
theory of reasonable classification. 32 The court (at p. 912 of 30 La. Ann.)
quoted with approval, from State v. Poydrus, 9 La. Ann. 165 (1854), the
following words:
"To be uniform, taxation need not be universal. Certain objects may be made its
subjects, and others may be exempted from its operation . . .but as between the
subjects of taxation in the same class there must be equality."
This rAtionale demands as the price of validity that the exemption
statute must be of general and uniform application. Even under the liberal
view, a special exemption of limited application will be invalid for lack of
uniformity and equality. 33 Other constitutional provisions less explicit than
34
thoge above quoted have been held not to invalidate tax exemption 'statutes.
The Bill of Rights contained in the Organic Act of Puerto Rico36 provides that "The rule of taxation in Puerto Rico shall be uniform." The lfederal
and Puerto Rican cases construing this provision are in accord with those
previously discussed. They hold generally that it demands uniformity only
within classifications which the legislature may make, so long as they are
not arbitrary.3 6 Under the authorities, the present statute would be difficult to
attack on this ground.
31. LOuISIANA CoNsT. Art. 118.

-32. In reference to an identical clause of the Mississippi Constitution (art. 12, § 20),
it was said in Mississippi Mills v. Cook, 56 Miss. 40, 60 (1878) that "It does not take
away from the Legislature the discretion to select the subjects. But when the selection is
made, all property of that sort must bear its proportional part of the burden."
See also New Orleans v. Kaufman, 29 La. Ann. 283, 29 Am. Rep. 328 (1877), where
the court states that "the constitutional provision that taxes shall be equal and uniform
does not prevent the legislature, or any municipal corporation authorized thereto by the
legislature, from dividing the objects of taxation into different classes, and imposing
different taxes on each class. It merely requires that the tax on each member of the
same class shall be the same."
A similar result was reached in Kitanning Coal Co. v. Commonwealth, 79 Pa. St.
100 (1875) under a clause (PA. CoNs". Art. 9, § 1) requiring that "all taxes shall be
uniform upon the same class of subjects."
33. Brewer Brick Co. v. Town of Brewer, 62 Me. 62, 16 Am. Rep. 395 (1873).
34. Crafts v. Ray, 22 R. I. 179, 46 Atl. 1043 (1900), where art. I, § 2 of the state
constitution said that "the burdens of the state ought to be fairly distributed among its
citizens"; and Colton v. Montpelier, 71 Vt.413, 45 Atl. 1039 (1899), where art. 9 of the
Vermont Bill of Rights declared that every member of society is bound to contribute his
proportion towards the expense of the protection of life, liberty, and property.
35. 39 STAT. 951 (1917), 48 U. S. C. § 737.
36. Ballester-Ripoll v. Court of Tax Appeals of Puerto Rico, 142 F. 2d 11 (C. C. A.
1st 1944); Revera v. Buscaglia, 146 F. 2d 461 (C. C. A. 1st 1944); Flores Alvaroz &
Company v. Gallardo, 36 P. R. 105).
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An attack on the statute, based upon the due process and equal protection
clause, probably also would be of dubious efficacy. The Supreme Court of
the United States has not extended the public purpose doctrine into the field
of tax exemptions. Mr. Justice Bradley, speaking for a unanimous court in
Bell's Gap R. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 134 U. S.232, 237 (1890), laid down the
rule thus: 37
"The provision in the fourteenth amendment, that no state shall deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws, was not intended to prevent
a state from adjusting its system of taxation in all proper and reasonable ways.
It may, if it chooses, exempt certain classes of property from any taxation at all.
We think we are safe in saying that the fourteenth amendment was not intended
...
to compel the states to adopt an iron rule of equal taxation. If that were its proper
construction, it would . . render nugatory those discriminations which the best
interests of society require; which are necessary for the encouragement of needed
and useful industries, and the discouragement of intemperance and vice, and which
every state, in one form or another, deems it expedient to adopt."
REvOCABILITY OF EXEMPTIONS. PossIBLE AMENDMENTS

The law here under discussion represents a conciliatory gesture by the
Puerto Rican Legislature toward businessmen from the North. There has

been considerable agitation in the past against "absentee capitalists." But
the present regime is characterized by friendliness toward outside business
interests. The governments of the Island have generally had a truly
"American" sense of public moral responsibility. There is no ground for
fearing that these tax exemptions will be repealed before they expire by their
terms. However, it is fairly well settled that general exemptions conferred

by statute do not create contractual rights immune from subsequent impairment, even where persons have acted in reliance thereon. 8 Therefore, it is
possible that the law should be amended to protect entrepreneurs fully against
premature amendment dr repeal. Already such changes are under discussion.
The leading case on the question of revocability is East Saginaw Mfg.
Co. v. East Saginaw, 80 U.S. (18 Wall.) 373 (1871) affirming 19 Mich. 259,
2 Am. Rep. 82 (1869). The statute there under consideration was for the

encouragement of salt manufacturing in Michigan. Originally having enacted
(in 1859) an unlimited exemption from taxation for all property so utilized, 39
37. For similar language in reference to Puerto Rico, see Monllor & Boscio v. Sancho,
136 F. 2d 114 (C. C. A. 1st 1943). Note also that decisions dealing with the validity of
state laws under the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution are applicable in
-determining the. validity of Puerto Rican laws under the Organic Act: Roig v. Puerto
Rico, 147 F. 2d 87 (C. C. A. 1st 1945).
38. East Saginaw Mfg. Co. v. East Saginaw, 19 Mich. 259, 2 Am. Rep. 82 (1869),
aff'd, 13 Wall. 373 (U. S. 1871); City of Springfield v. Smith, 138 Mo. 645, 40 S.W.
757 (1897) ; Bank of Owensboro v. Daviess Co., 102 Ky. 174, 39 S.W. 1030 (1897). In
Shiner v. Jacobs, 62 Iowa 392, 17 N W. 613 (1883), an exemption given on account of
the planting of trees was held repealable even as to one who had planted trees in reliance
-thereon.
39. Act of Feb. 15, 1859.
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the legislature subsequently limited the exemption to five years. 40 The company
sued to enjoin taxation after the five year period had expired. It alleged that
it had been formed and had engaged in the manufacturing of salt solely in
reliance upon "the encouragement held out in said act." On a demurrer by
which the truth of this allegation was admitted, the bill was dismissed.
The United States Supreme Court, speaking unanimously, again per
Bradley, J., (at p. 378 and 379 of 80 U.S.) twice emphasized the fallacy
in plaintiff's argument:
"It is a general law, regulative of the internal economy of the State, and as much
subject to repeal and alteration as a law forbidding the killing of game in certain
seasons of the year. Its continuance is a matter of public policy only; and those
who rely on it must base their reliance on the free and voluntary good faith of the
legislature."
"General encouragements, held 'out to all persons indiscriminately, to engage in a
particular trade or manufacture, whether such encouragement be in the shape of
bounties or drawbacks, or other advantage, are always under the legislative control,
and may be discontinued at any time."
On the other hand, where there is a bargain for consideration, the
exemption will not be subject to impairment by subsequent legislation. 4 '

A typical situation where such a contract is found to exist is where the
exemption is contained in a corporate chapter. 42 However, even in circumstances considerably less clear than this, a few cases have found a valid

contract to exist. In Caverly-Go id Co. v. Village of Springfield, 83 Vt. 396,
76 Atl. 39 (1910),

pursuant to an enabling act (Vt. Stats. § 365). the

defendant town had by vote granted an exemption to the petitioner. The case,
says the court (at p. 402 of 83 Vt.)

"is to be governed by the contract between the town and the orator,
evidenced by the offer made by the vote of March 26, 1898, and its
acceptance by the orator. The vote was to e~cempt from taxation for
10 years all manufacturing establishments investing a capital of
over $5000 that might be established and put in operation during the
then next 12 months. This was the offer, and the orator accepted
it by complying with its requirements in every particular therein
expressed."
The result was then _plain:
40. Act of March 15, 1861.
41. U. S. CoNsT. ART. I, § 19. The Organic Act for Puerto Rico states similarly that
"No law impairing the obligation of contracts shall be enacted." 39 STAT. § 951 (1917),
48 U. S. C. § 737. See 2 COOLEY, TAXATION § 701 (4th ed. 1924); Baker, op. cit. inlra n.
43 at p. 236.
42. These instances were quite frequent prior to the development of modern incorporation statutes. For example, some sixty statutes granting exemptions to specifically named
enterprises were passed by the New Hampshire Legislature, usually in the form of
corporate charters, between 1805 and 1820. See Eyers Woolen Co. v. Gilsum, 84 N. H. 1,
19, 146 Atl. 511 (1929).
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"We hold, therefore, that the vote here was authorized by the
statute, and that the town was bound by it when the orator acted
upon it, as it did, with a view to the exemption."
This case is clearly an exceptional one43 and in general no contractual
relationship will be found, except where there exists express statutory
language creating such a relationship, 44 or equivalent circumstances clearly
indicative of intent to create a binding contract. 45 The generally accepted rule
is that stated by the Connecticut court in State ex rel. Foote v. Bartholonew,
108 Conn. 246, 247, 142 Atl. 800, 803 (1928):
"In order to give a statute granting an exemption such a contractual nature that it
may not be repealed, it is necessary in the first place that there be a clear intent to
create something more than a mere privilege or bounty, repealable at the will of
the legislature. . . . To give to a tax exemption the nature of a contractual obligation it must be supported by a consideration.... Finally, it is to be remembered that
to give to a tax exemption the effect of a contractual obligation is to limit the power
of the Legislature to mould legislation to meet the needs of the varying circumstances of the times and inevitably to produce inequalities in tax burdens. Such a
result is to be avoided if it can be by any reasonable intendment.
CONSTRUCTION

AND INTERPRETATION

The theory of strict construction 4 6 followed in the cases cited above
is generally also followed by the courts in considering other aspects of tax
exemption laws.4 7 In analyzing the present Puerto Rican statute, it may be
43. COOLEYv, LAW OF TAXATION, § 702 (4th ed. 1924); Zumbalen, The Federal
Constitution and Contract Exemptions from Taxation, 17 ST. Louis L. Ray. 191
(1932) ; Many of the cases are collected in Baker, Some Questions Raised in. the Field of
Tax Exemption, 8 TEXAs L. Rav. 196, 235 n. 256 (1930). See also, Colby, Exemption from
Taxation by Legislative Contract, 13 Am. L. RFv. 26 (1878).
44. See N. H. Laws of 1860, ch. 2361: "All manufacturing establishments . . . are
exempted from taxation for ten years after the passage of this act; provided towns and
cities in which such manufacturing establishments may be located ... shall ... give their
assent to such exemption; and such assent shall have the force of a contract.' That such
a legislative contract is binding, see Dow v. Railroad, 67 N. H. 1, 49, 52 (1886), and In Re
Opinion of the Justices, 261 Mass. 523, 553, 159 N. E. 55 (1928), where in construing a
similar clause, the court said, "The sovereign power itself may in certain conditions for
the public welfare make a binding contract as to exemptions from taxation."
45. See Portland v. Portland Water Co., 67 Me. 135, 136 (1877) : "Here the action of
the legislature, with the vote of the city in pursuance of it, partakes the character of a
contract with the defendant corporation. The consideration for a contract on the part of
the cit is palpable. The defendants are obliged to furnish without expense to the city, all
the water for its public buildings, and school-houses, and for the extinguishment of fires,
that may be needed therefor; and the defendants are also under considerable obligations to
the city and state."
46. The basis of the rule is set forth in COOLEY, op. cit. supra n. 43, §§ 672-74. See
also, CooLEY, op. cit. supra n. 43, passim, and Baker, op. cit. infra n. 47.
47. See, for example, Waller v. Hughes, 2 Ariz. 114, 11 Pac. 122 (1886), construing a
tax statute so as not to exempt mines or mining claims; and Hart v. Plum, 14 Cal. 148
(1859), holding that an exemption of mining claims does not include the. flumes leading
thereto. Baker, Judicial Interpretation of Tax Exemption Statutes, 7 TEx. L. REv. 385
(1929), analyzes the pr6blems and possibilities of judicial construction in this field, showing how the tax structure may be affected by adoption of either loose or strict construction
principles. See also, Baker, op. cit. siupran. 43 at pp. 22-6-31.
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of value to investigate cases interpreting other industrial tax exemption laws,
with a view to determining to what extent its provisions obviate problems
of judicial interpretation encountered elsewhere.
The definition of an industry qualified for exemption in Puerto Rico
commences in terms of "methods of processing and manufacture, either by
'hand or by machinery." Most industrial tax exemption statutes have defined
the benefited parties in terms of "manufacture" or "manufacturing." An
extensive case law has developed construing these somewhat inexact words.
in reference to specific enterprises. A number of cases indicate in the usual
terms that the determinative factor is the legislative intent or purpose;45
others rely on a physical or functional test as applied to the conduct of the
business ;49 and still others look to the end result as conclusive. 50 Each case
must be determined on its own facts. The problem has been well stated in
Louisville v. Zinmneaster and Sons, 188 Ky. 570 at 576, 222 S.W. 958,
10 A.L.R. 1269 (1920)
"Courts have experienced much difficulty in determining what is a manufacturing
establishment, and what is included in the term "manufacture." There is no hard
and fast rule by which to determine whether a given establishment is a "mnanufacture," but all the facts and circumstances must be taken into consideration it
determining whether the establishment is or is not to be so reckoned. Whether it is
such an establishment does not depend upon the size of the plant, the number of
men employed, the nature of the business, or the article to be manufactured, but
upon all these together and upon the result accomplished.
"If raw material is converted at a factory or plant into a finished product, complete
and ready for the final use for which it is intended, or so completed as that in tile
ordinary course of business of the concern it is ready to be put upon the open market
for sale to any person wishing to buy it, the plant which turns it out is a nmanufacturing establishment within the meaning of the statutes."

The present Puerto Rican statute to some extent avoids these difficulties of construction. It provides that, to qualify for exemption, enterprises must "have as their object the production, in Puerto Rico, of articles
of commerce." It actually lists a large number of articles of commerce
which it would presumably be feasible to manufacture on the Island. In the
case of such articles, at least, the scope of the words "processing and manu48. Carroll County v. B. F. Shriver Co., 146 Md. 412, 126 Atl. 71 (1924). Cf. Neuhoff
Packing Co. v. Sharpe, 146 Tenn. 293, 240 S. W. 1101 (1921).
49. H. M. Rowe Co. v. State Tax Commissioner, 149 Md. 251, 131 Atd. 509 (1925),
ruling that manufacture means "the process of converting some material into a different
form adapted to uses which in its original form it could not be so readily adapted, and is.
associated nearly always with the use of manual or mechanical energy . . ."; Common-

wealth v. Weiland Packing Co., 292 Pa. St. 447, 141 Atl. 148 (1928), defining malufacture to mean "the production of some new article"; Dolese & S. Co. v. O'Connell, 257
Ill. 43, 100 N. E. 235 (1912) (semble to Wciland case).
50. P. Lorrilard Co. v. Ross, 183 Ky. 217, 209 S. W. 39 (1919), ruling that thdetermination turns upon whether there is a finished product fit for commercial use;
State v. Gardner & J. Co., 176 La. 221, 145 So. 521 (1933), using a test based on tme
creation of a physical product of "appreciable" durability.
51. Cf. Lexington v. Lexington Leader Co., 193 Ky. 107, 235 S. W. 31 (1921).
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facture" is not likely to be troublesome. The only question of statutory
interpretation before the Council will presumably be whether the finished
52
product is among those enumerated.
Difficulties have been encountered under statutes prescribing that the
applicant must be organized or operating exclusively for manufacturing purposes. Where the statute contains this requirement, 53 the courts have sometimes looked to the charter, rather than to the business actually being con54
ducted, to determine whether the applicant qualifies for tax exemption.
The rule of strict construction prevails here as elsewhere.5 5 Thus, a corporation organized to operate a distillery and also to engage in feeding
livestock is not exempt, for the latter purpose is not manufacturing.5 6 By
52. By expressly including production "by hand" within its terms, Act No. 346 avoids
the problem sometimes encountered of a court adopting the etymologically unsound position
that the use of extensive machinery is a significant criterion of "manufacturing." See, for
example, State v. American Sugar Refining Co., 108 La. 603, 32 So. 965 (1902), where,
largely on the ground that extensive machinery was being employed, a sugar refining
plant was held entitled to a manufacturing exemption. This case expressly overruled a
previous case on the same facts and under the same style, holding to the contrary: 51 La.
Ann. 562, 25 So. 447 (1898).
The usual rule is that the use of expensive and complicated machinery is not a determining factor: Commonwealth v. Sunbeam Water Co., 284 Pa. St. 180, 130 Atl. 405
(1925) (distilling of water) ; Commonwealth v. Glendora Products Co., 297 Pa. St. 305,
146 At. 896 (1929) (roasting coffee). Compare State v. American Biscuit Co., 47 La.
Ann. 160, 16 So. 750 (1895) (Held: exemption for manufacturing obtains where crackers
and biscuits are produced on a large scale by machinery.)
53. Pennsylvania Act of June 1, 1889, P. L. 420, as supplemented, 72 P. S. § 1892:
"actually and exclusively employed in . . .manufacturing." This statute is construed in
Commonwealth v. Paul W. Bounds Co., infra n. 55. See also the Illinois statute (2 STAnR
& C. ANN. STAT. p. 2032) construed in Distilling & Cattle Feeding Co. v. People, infra
n. 56, which has the terminology, "organized for purely manufacturing purposes."
54. Commonwealth v. J. B. Lippincott Co., 156 Pa. St. 513, 27 At. 10 (1893). In
Commonwealth v. Filbert Paving & Construction Co., 229 Pa. St. 231, 234, 78 Atl. 104
(1910), the court says, "the company was incorporated for manufacturing purposes and
has a prima facie right under its charter to do a manufacturing business. While the
purpose stated in the charter is not conclusive of the nature and character of the business
to be transacted, it does primarily indicate the purpose for which the corporation is
created.., the burden rests upon those who challenge the primary purpose stated in the
certificate of incorporation to show that it is something different."
55. "Where a corporation is not organized for manufacturing, whether it is doing
manufacturing or not, it is not entitled to any manufacturing exemption." Commonwealth
v. Paul W. Bounds Co., 316 Pa. St. 29, 31, 173 Atl. 633 (1934). Accord, Commonwealth v.
Westinghouse Electric & Mfg. Co., 151 Pa. St. 265, 24 Atl. 1107 (1892).
The use of the word "manufacturing" in the articles of incorporation is not conclusive:
Commonwealth v. Arrott Mills, 145 Pa. St. 69, 22 Atl. 243 (1891) (corporation chartered
to manufacture steam held not exempt on ground it was "not a manufacturer or producer
of anything.") ; Commonwealth v. Wark Co., 301 Pa. St. 150, 151 Ati. 786 (1930) (corporation chartered to engage in "the manufacture of buildings and structures" held not
exempt) ; and Commonwealth v. Philadelphia Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 15 Pa. D. & C.
254 (1930) (corporation chartered "to manufacture ... carbonated waters, syrups'and
beverages" held not engaged in manufacturing, hence not exempt).
Where the statute requires the applicant to be "wholly engaged in carrying on manufacture within the state," if any part of the manufacturing is done elsewhere, the exemption does not obtain: People ex rel. American Soda Fountain v. Roberts, 158 N. Y. 168,
52 N. E. 1104 (1899) ; People ex rel. Schwarzchild & S. Co. v. Roberts, 11 App. Div.
449, 42 N. Y. Supp. 317 (1896), ajff'd, 156 N. Y. 690, 50 N. E. 1121 (1898). See arso
People ex rel. Seth Thomas Clock Co. v. Wemple, 133 N. Y. 323, 31 N. E. 238 (1892).
56. Distilling & Cattle Feeding Co. v. People, 161, Ill. 101, 43 N. E. 779 (1896).
But see Dolese & S. Co. v. O'Connell, 257 Ill. 43, 100 N. E. 235 (1912), where a corporation organized to manufacture building materials and to construct roads, was held exempt
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defining "new industry" in terms of the article produced, the Puerto Rican
act presumably avoids these problems.
A few cases have set forth a special rule to the effect that a corporation
which, pursuant to charter powers, engages in a non-manufacturing . enterprise related and incidental to the manufacturing business, is nevertheless
entitled to an exemption on property employed in the latter category, for the
auxiliary activity does not affect the "exclusive" nature of the manufacturing
business.57 Act No. 346 contains no restrictive language of this sort. The
act as a whole seems to indicate that any person, natural or artifical, may
embark upon "new industry" production, regardless of whether non-exempt
manufacturing is now proceeding, and qualify thereby for tax exemption.
This conclusion is borne out by the statutory language limiting the scope of
the exemption to "such property as, in the judgment of the Executive Council,
is necessary for the development, organization, construction, establishment,
and operation of said new industry," 58 to "the income which the applicant may
derive from the exploitation of said industry"; 9 and to license taxes, fees
or other imposts upon "the exploitation and operation of any feature of
said new industry." "o When it is recalled that "new industry" is largely
defined in terms of the article produced, it becomes clearly possible for the
exemption to apply to one or more parts of a larger industrial enterprise. 61
These same considerations would seem to permit exemption to be conferred upon persons engaged in a "'new industry" even where the same is
incidental or auxiliary to a non-exempt activity. This is true under the
where the latter charter power was never exercised. But, contra, where the secondary
power is exercised: People ex rel. Syracuse Improvement Co. v. Morgan, 59 App. Div.
302, 69 N:.Y. Supp. 263 (1901).
57. Commonwealth v. Juniata Coke Co., 157 Pa. 507, 27 Atl. 373 (1893) (mining
coal to use in business of manufacturing coke) ; Commonwealth v. Savage Fire Brick Co.,
157 Pa. 512, "27 Atl. 374 (1893) (mining clay to be used in business of manufacturing
fire bricks, tiles, etc.) ; People ex rel. Tiffany & Co,v. Campbell, 154 N. Y. 166, 38 N. E.
990 (1894) (corporation empowered to Manufacture gold and silverware, and to engage in
distribution iid sale of its own products). But compare People ex rel. Western Electric
Co. v. Campbell, 145 N. Y. 587, 40 N. E. 239 (1895), where a corporation chartered to
engage in the mericantile buying and selling of electrical equipment generally, as well as to
manufacture such articles, was held not exempt.
58. Section 2(a).
59. Section 2(b).
60. Section 2(c).
61. This construction avoids results often reached under other tax exemption statutes.
A number of cases hold that the expansion of an existing plant, or the building of a new
and larger one, even where the purpose is to produce a new line, or a greater variety, of
articles, does not constitute the establishment of a "new industry" within the meaning of
the tax exemption statute: Louisville v. Louisville Tin & Stove Co., 170 Ky. 557, 186
S. W. 124 (1916) j(small tin shop replaced by a large factory using much machinery to
produce many new articles); Mengel Box Co. v. Sea, 167 Ky. 193, 180 S. W. 347 (1915)
(dw plant added to wooden box factory in order to produce paper boxes) ; B. F. McCormick Lumber Co. v. Winchester, 155 Ky. 494, 159 S. W. 997 (1913) (planing mill producing for the wholesale market enlarged and improved in order to begin producing for the
retail market) ; Tallassee Mfg. Co. v. Spigener, 49 Ala. 262 (1873) (cotton factory with
4,000 spindles erilarged by the addition of new buildings operating 14,000 spindles). '
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Puerto. Rican law although the cases indicate that a contrary result is more
usual under many industrial tax exemption statutes. 62 Since production on
a "commercial scale" is all that is asked for, 63 the rationale of Illinois Central
R. Co. v. Paducah, 228 Ky. 65, at p. 70, 14 S.W. 2d 172 (1929) 64 would
seem particularly apropos here:
"If the purpose was to encourage manufacturing, then that purpose is attained when
a person, firm, or corporation engaged in manufacturing, although not exclusively
so, and although incidentally to some other business carried on by him or it. The
pay rolls are the same, the labor afforded is the same-in fact, all the benefits...
are the same."

A possible difficulty, but not a serious one, in determining what is a
"new industry" in Act No. 346 is found in the words "riw materials."

In

order to qualify for the exemption, the applicant must intend to engage, or
be engaged, in such a method of processing and manufacture "as shall, by

transforming rav materials," have as its object the production of certain
described articles of commerce. 65 If this term were defined strictly (i.e. the

basic 'materials in their natural state) the act would be practically nullified;
except for its agricultural lands, Puerto Rico has few known natural resources. 6 6

Most of the articles in the enumeration of § 1 (c), however, are produced
from previously semi-fabricated materials.
Unnecessary violence to the obvious legislative purpose
if

would be done

a strict definition of "raw materials" were emphasized as a limitation

upon the force of the enumeration and description of exempt products.6

7

The

use of the term need not be rejected as pure surplusage, but should be relegated to a position of relative unimportance in all but the most extreme cases.
The deletion from the definition of the limiting proviso found in the 1936
62. People ex rel. New England Dressed Meat & Wool Co. v. Roberts, 155 N. Y. 408,
50 N. E. 53 (1898) (fertilizer manufactured incidental to slaughterhouse) ; Commonwealth
v. Keystone Laundry Co., 203 Pa. St. 289, 52 Atl. 326 (1902) (soaps and dyes produced
incidental to a laundry) ; State ex rel. Ernst v. State and City Board, 36 La. Ann. 347
(1884) (rice flour manufactured incidental to rice milling does not qualify the miller for
an exemption given to flour manufacturers). Contra: Illinois Central R. Co. v. Paducah,
228 Ky. 65, 14 S. W. 2d 172 (1929) (manufacture of engine and car parts incidental to
railroad business).
63. See § 1 (b) and the proviso following § 1 (c). For cases where the volume of
business was a factor considered in determining whether the applicant was engaged in
manufacturing so that a tax exemption law applied, see Hughes & Co. v. Lexington, 211
Ky. 596, 277 S. W. 981 (1925) (food products); Commissioners of Carroll County v.
Shriver Co., 146 Md. 412, 126 Atl. 71 (1924) (food products) ; and Baltimore v. State
Tax Commission, 161 Md. 234, 155 Atl. 739 (1931) (machinery and metal products).
64. In this case, tax exemption was held to apply to a corporation engaged in the
manufacture of engine and railroad car parts incidental to a railroad enterprise.
65. Section 1.
66. See 22 Eicyc. Americana 401 (1939); 18 Encyc. Brit. 261 (14th ed. 1938);
Hearings on S. 952, supra n. 16, p. 155, 202.
67. A strict interpretation is fully justifiable where the statute specifies the raw
material to be used. Under a lav exempting from taxation enterprises manufacturing
"paper and paper products out of wood pulp," a factory making paper bags out of kraft
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statute (quoted supra, p. 2) indicates that this was the intention of the
legislature.
Some support for this position may be found in the authorities. Under
a Kentucky statute conferring exemption from taxation upon raw materials
in the process of manufacture, the following gloss has been placed upon the
words:'6s
"By the term 'raw material,' as used in the statute, is not necessarily meant crude
material in its natural state, but there may be included in the term a product made
from the crude material, and which has undergone manufacturing processes and
been converted into a distinct product from which an entirely different one may
be made by the application of additional scientific processes, in which case the converted or prepared material may be regarded as 'raw material' within the meaning
of the statute."
Scientific progress is constantly shifting the panorama of industrial
processes; tifs concept of "raw materials" must neclssarily be a dynamic
rather than a static one.6 9 In Act No. 346 it is probably meant only to exclude
from the exemption those enterprises which do not add some substantial
new value, form, shape, or utility to the materials subjected to "processing
and manufacture." 70 As recently stated by the Kentucky court,7 '
" 'Raw material' is susceptible of no definite and all inclusive definition and this
term must be interpreted as it is commonly understood by all mankind and in the
sense in which it was used by the Legislature and the purpose it sought to accomplish."
Occasionally, the qualifications of an applicant for tax exemption are
questioned on the ground that he is not actively engaged in the business
exempted. Where an abandonment of the business has occurred, the status of
paper made from wood pulp by another concern is not exempt: Pineland Bag Co. v.
Riley, 142 Miss. 574, 107 So. 554 (1926). Cf. Cohn v. Parker, 41 La. Ann. 894, 6 So.
718 (1889), where it was held that a producer of clothing out of already manufactured
cloth was not within an exemption to manufacturers of "textile fabrics."
68. Henderson v. George Decker Co., 193 Ky. 248, 257, 235 S. W. 732 (1921). Accord,
Louisville v. Louisville Tin & Stove Co., supra n. 61.
69. See Note, Raw Materials, 13 ENcYc. Soc. ScIE. 123, 124 (1934). In Todd
Co. v. Bond Bros., 300 Ky. 224, 188 S.W. 2d 325 (1945) where fully sawed and shaped
railroad ties were held to be raw materials of a creosoting plant, the court said: "A
number of years ago the creosoting process of ties was generally unknown, and . . .
during that time the railroad tie was completely manufactured when it left the saw
mill, but under the modern processing, such ties are not completed, or ready for the use
intended, nor made into a saleable product until after the final chemical treatment."
(188 S. W. 2d at 328). For a contrary view, in an earlier industrial climate, on the same
facts, see Shreveport Creosoting Co. v. Shreveport, 119 La. 637, 44 So. 325 (1907).
70. See Norris v. Commonwealth, 27 Pa. St. 494 (1856) where the court remarked
that manufacturing "does not often mean the production of a new article out of materials
wholly raw. It generally consists in giving new shapes, new qualities, or new combinations
to matter which has already gone through some other artificial process."
71. Stearns Coal & Lumber Co. v. Thomas, 295 Ky. 808, 810, 175 S. W. 2d 505
(1943).
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"manufactiirer" no longer exists, and a pre-existing exemption is terniinated. 72
On the other 'hand, a temporary suspension' of business for 'a reasonable
time because of some legitimate business exigency, where not amounting to
abandonment, will not normally end the. exemption. 73 Act No: 346 eliminates
uncertaiity on this point by conferring discretion directly upon the :Executive Council, with the Governor's approval, to rev.oke ani exemption, "if the
-natural or artificial person, to whom the benefit of the exemption has been
granted ... discontinues production, on a conimercial scale, '6f uch article
or articles of commerce, and fails to resume such production within ue. period
or periods fixed for him by the Executive Council of Puerto Rico for the
purpose."

74

Under' statutes requiring the applicant to "be "actially engaged"'in manufacturing, where the applicant is not the operator but only the ownier-lessor
of a plant, the cases are in conflict. It'has been held tbat"the owner of the
plant is not entitled to exemption after leasing it, even though the same type
of manufacturing is carried on by the lessee.7 5 Even under a'statu't which
authorized rfiunicipalities to grant exemptions to "any manufactuiing establisliin1ent" and '"the" capital to be used in operating the same," the New
76
Hampshire court managed to hold the lessor not entitled to the exemption.
On the other hand, a very strong argument has been used to support a
contrary holding: 7 7
"The primary bbject of this statute is, not t6 aid and benefit private persons for
private ends, but its purpose is to'benefit the public at large by increasing, in the
end, the resources of the state and its taxable property through the establishment
of new industries."
72. Electric Traction Co. v. New Orleans, 45 La. Ann. 1475, 14 So. 231 (1893);
State, Edison Phonograph Co., Pros. v. State Assessors, 55 N. J. L. 55, 25 At. 329

(1892).

73. Bradford v. Mote, 2 Mary.. (Del.) .159, 42 AtI, 445 (1895) (organ plant
suspended operations because of lack of funds); Waterbury v. Atlas Steam Cordage Co.,
42 La. Ann. 723, 7 So. 783 (1890) (held, exemption c6ntihues for period adiiing which
closed down "for prudential reasons, on account of the high price of hemp-', but not
during period when plant was leased and closed down by the lessee "for -he purpose
of stopping competition and reducing the supply of rope.")
74. Section 6.
75. Felippe A. Broadbent Mantel Co. v. Baltimore, 134 Md. 90, 106 At. 250 (1919).
The holding of Commonwealth v. Macungie Iron Co., 9 Pa. Dist. ReIl. 477 (1891), in
accord, was later nullified by legislation expressly stating that a lease does not cause
the lessor to lose its tax exemption: Act of July 11, 1901, quoted in Commonwealth v.
Cambria Iron Co., 5 Dauphin Co. Rep. (Pa.) 101 (1902)..
76. "If the mere use of the property, without regard to its ownership, had been
intended to be the test to determine whether it could be exempted under the statute, it
would be natural to expect more explicit language indicating such a.purpose." Portsmouth Shoe Co. v. Portsmouth, 74 N. H. 222, 66 Atl. 1045 (1907). Accord, State ex rel.
Ward v. Board of Assessors, 46 La. Ann. 859, 15 So. 384 (1894).
77. Colton v. Montpelier, 71 Vt. 413, 417, 45 Ad. 1039 (1899).,. Accord, see
Caverly-Gould Co. v. Village of Springfield, 83 Vt. 396, 76 Atl. 39 (1910), where the
lessee had been previously engaged in a different established business not entitled .to
exemption.
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"This end is as effectually attained by the erection of such establishment and
buildings, and the furnishing of such machinery and appliances, to be used and
operated by tenants, as would be the case were the same used and operated for a
like pUiipdse by the owner thereof. Without the opportunity to rent such plants,
it. is apparent'that persons with capital sufficient to carry on a successful business
therein, but unable financially to erect such plants, would be deterred from engaging in manufacturing, while with an 6pportunity to rent they would develop new
industries. On the other hand, it is conceivable that capitalists might take the
risk of 'building a manufacturing plint; if they could rent the same, and take the
benefit of the e: emption for a time, when they would not make the investment were
they compelled to operate it themselves in order to have the benefit of such
exemption."'

Act No. 346 is inconclusive on this subject. The Executive, Council is
authorized, upon notice and hearing and with the Governor's approval, to
revoke an exemption "when, without the authorization of the Executive
Council or of the Governor of Puerto Rico, the person who obtained the
exemption transfers to another the control or possession of the personal
property or the machinery used by him for the production of the article or
articles listed in his application for exemption." 78 The implication here
seems to be that the exemption will continue in effect unless terminated
administratively. But this is not a reliable assumption and an exempt manufacturer would do well not to lease out his manufacturing properties without authorization.
A few cases have held that assembly plants were not entitled to tax
exemptions because they were not engaged in manufacturing 9 Under a
Louisiana constitutional provision exempting plants manufacturing "articles
of wo6d,"8 0 a barrel assembly plant was not qualified, largely because, in
the court's opinion, it merely put together previously manufactured articles.81
Other cases, however, recognize that manufacturing:
"does not often mean the production of a new article out of materials entirely
raw. It geneiilly consists in giving new shapes, new qualities, or new edtnbinatlons
to' matter which has already gone through some artificial process." 82
78. Section 6(4).
79. People ex rel. Seth Thomas Clo& Co. v. Wemple, 133. N. Y. 323, 31 N. E. 238
(1892); People ex rel. John A. Roebling's Sons' Co. v. Wemple, 138 N. Y. 582, 34
N: E. 386 (1893); Brooklyn Cooperagd Co. v. New Orleans, 47 La. Ann. 114, 17 So.
804 (1895); Chickasaw Cooperage Co. v. Police Jury, 48 La. Ann. 523, .19 So., 476
(1896); Lake Bros. v. Guillotte, 48 La. Ann. 870, 19 So. 924 '(1896).
80. ART. 207, LOUISIANA CONST. Of 1879.
81. Brooklyn Cooperage Co. v. New Orleans, supra n. 80, followed in Chickasaw
Cooperdge o. v. Police Jury, supra n. 80. Compare Henderson v. George Decker Co., 193
Ky. 248, 235 S. W. 732 (1921), where .the uphostering and assembly of btdgies was
held
th'e court.saying: "If defendants in the two instant cases were' engaged in
only exempt,
a technical.asembling
of the vehicles .. we would not be inclined to' cllaradterize
them as manufacturers .. But, under the agreed facts, we think there can be no doubt
that they are engaged in something requiring more mechanical processes and efforts than
the mere act dfig]ssembling already finished and completed parts."
82. Norris Bros. v. Commonwealth, 27 Pa. St. 494, 496 (1856) (assembling locomotives). Compare Louisville v. Louisville Tin & Stove Co., supra n. 61 (assembling
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Act No. 346 expressly -includes assembly. plants within the definition
of new industries 8 3 subject to certain qualifications:
"By assembly plants shall be understood those factories engaged in the productioz-fi articles of conimerce, excludifig furniture, by putting together the parts,
.p'oVided the cost- of the work of assembling the article represents 2ti'ch"a sub-

stantial',part of the total cost of the article that in the opinion of the. Executive
C.oupceil: the industry deserves the exemption herein provided."

.

-

This qualification appears to be based on the same rationale as the
majority of the cases. The economic value of the assembling operation has
been a significant factor in determining whether an exemption is applicable.8 4
No definite rules can be formulated as to how large must be the added cost
in order to be deemed "substantial" by the Executive Council. The decision
is expressly left within the bounds of its discretion.8 5 At any rate,' the act
permits a presumptively final determination of the question in. advance and
without-resort to the courts.
.
A question arises occasionally whether a manufacturing corporation
which causes all or part of its business to be done by contractors..is entitled
to an industrial tax exemption. Under statutes exempting "manufacture," the
rule of the cases seems to be that where all, or most, of the manufacturing
is contract4ec for, leaving, none,. or only a negligible part of, the process to
be done by the appirant, the exemption does not obtain.86 Only one case
of stoves and other metal articles held to be manufacturing, where part of'the materials
were previofisly manufactured, and part were raw) ; New Orleans v. LeBIaic 34 La. Ann.
596 (1882) (coopers making barrels in part from raw materials held .ekept .

83, Section 1"(c) (36).

84. Cases hwding assembly plant not exempt: Lake Bros. v. Guill5tte, supra n. 80,

where the court said, "The work in Louisiana is infinitesimal as corp#ed with the work

elsewhere on the different articles."; People ex rel. Seth Thomas Clocc.'Co. v. Wemple,
supra n. 80, where the court ruled that "A manufacturing corporation"oi another state
cannot bring its products here, and by putting the several parts together and adjusting
them to ech other, or y performing upon the article some slight operation, though it
may involve labor that may be necessary before using it or exposing it for sale and
thereby entitle to exemption from taxation oil the ground that it is carrying on manufacturing within the state."; and People ex rel. John A. Roebling's Sons' Co. v. Wemple,
supra n. 80, where the court found that the apblicant's operations "consist of some additional incidental work to its manufactured products sent here from the other "state
where its actual manufacturing operations are ...

carried on."

Case holding assembly plant exempt: People ex rel. L. E. Waterman Co. v.. Morgan,
48 App. Div. 395, 63 N. Y. Supp. 76 (1900), where the court says, "this work creates an
integral fountain pen which is four times more valuable than the parts purchased."
85. It.is interesting to note that in one case, where from the facts it appears that the
cost of assembly was about 50% of the total cost of production, the*assembly plant
was nevertheless held not exempt: Chickasaw Cooperage Co. v. Police Jury, supra n. 80.
86. People v. Horn Silver Mining Co., 105 N. Y. 76, 11 N. E. 155 (1887) (no
manufacturing exemption where all refining of ore was done by contractor). In Commonwealth v. Williamsport Rail Co., 250 Pa. St. 596, 95 Atl. 795 (1915),. the court, by a
per curiam opinion, approved the holding in the court below that "buying raw material
and sending the same to d company owning a plant, and paying that company an agreed
price, to shape the raw material into a manufactured product, is not carrying on the
buisiness of manufacturing within the state."
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has been found where, under these circumstances, the contractor wai held
87
entitled to the exemption.
The question may be important as it affects needlework. "Embroidery"
is one of the articles in the specifically exempted class.8 s The production of
needlework (including embroidery) in Puerto Rico has long been largely
a homework industry, organized through a complex system of contractors and
subcontractors.8 9 On its face, the language of the act is broad enough to
include homework production. This is particularly true since the definition
of "new industry" is keyed to the article produced rather than to the organization of the production. Whether the act will be deemed applicable only to
industrial plants and shops, and not to subcontracting of homework remains
for future administrative and perhaps judicial determination. It is to be noted,
however, that the" proviso following section 1 (c) employs the words "industrial establishmeint" at two places, and the words "industrial facilities"
in a third. This provision defines the rights of previously operating enterprises, which, under the product enumeration, may qualify for the "new
industry" exemption. Therefore. it is at least possible to infer that the legislature granted tax exemption only to factories or shops, and not to less
centralized organizations 'like homework industries.
A .final problem of statutory construction arises from the enumeration
of exempt products. The exact scope of the words employed therein is to
some extent a technical problem. For example, the products covered by such
See People ex rel. Turner Construction Co. v. Cantor, 196 App. Div. 213, 186 N. Y.
Supp. 890 (1921), where the prosecuting 'company, engaged in constructing buildings
through contractors, which did not maintain any shops to manufacture articles for use
in its business except "one small woodworking mill," was held not to be engaged in
manufacturing, hence not exempt. Cf. dicta in People ex reL. Stokes v. Roberts, 90
Hun.- (N. Y.) 533, 36 N. Y. Supp. 73 (1895), indicating that where a substantial amount
of the work involved is done by the contractee, in addition to that done by the contractor,
the former may be -entitled to tax exemption.
87. State ex rel. N. American Phonograph Co. v. State Bd. of Assessors, 54 N. J. 1.
430, 24 Atl. 507 (1892), in which the decision turned on the view that the contracting
parties were in the relation of principal and agent. In reference to the principal, then,
says the court, We plant of the contracting manufacturer "is pro hac vice its plant, and
it is':thereby located and carries on bhsiness within this state."
A similiar argUment was expressly refuted, however, in H. M. Rowe Co. v. Beck,
149 Md.-251, 131" At. 509 (1925) and People ex rel. Jewelers' Circular Publishing Co.:
v. Roberts, 155 N. Y: 1, 49 N. E. 248 (1898).
88. Section 1 (c) (32). Although much needlework is done in the home (see Puerto

Rico Dept. of LaboF A)Inual-)Report, 1941-42, p. 16), nevertheless some 263 factory
type establishments engaged i.needlework, employing 11,288 persons, were instected by
the Department of Labor in the fiscal year 1941-42 (ibid. p. 42).
In the fiscal year 1939-47), Puerto Rico exported $15,432,000 of needlework, second

only to sugar axnd molasses in value of exports. Puerto Rico Dept. of Agric. and
Commerce, Puerto Rico, Industrialand Conimericial,24 (1941). Detailed statistics on the
needlework industry can be founa -inibid,, p. 41. A full description of this industry

is contained in De Golia, Porto Rico :"What It Produces and What It Buys, Cf. S. Dept.
of Commerce, TP-ama INFO. BuLL. 785, 26 et seq. (1932).
89. De Golia, op. cit. supra n. 88, p. 26 et seq.; DIrIE, op. cit. n.14, p. 179 c seq.
In the summer of 1942, the Commissioner of Labor reported that, in the needlework
industry, somewhat less than 4000 women were working in shops, and somewhat less
than 40,000 in the home. Puerto Rico Dept. of Labor, Anual Report, 1941-42 p. 15-16.
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words as "cosmetics," "tannery product," and "articles of straw, reed, and
other fibers" are clearly more numerous than those encompassed by "matches,"
"candles," and "soaps." Intermediate between these groups may be found
other enumerated items of varying degrees of specificity.
.Under comparable statutes,90 the courts have been faced with a substantial amount of litigation, as various enterprises have sought to bring
themselve.s within the scope of one of the enumerated industries designated
as tax-exempt. Hence, one finds cases-holding that bags made from paper
are no.t "articles of wood,"91 nor are bricks deemed "articles in a finished
state"; 92 and a cotton ginnery is not engaged in the manufacture or processing of cotton." 93 Illuminating gas and seltzer water are not "chemicals"; 94
feed for live stock is not "flour"; 95 linotypes produced by linotype machines
are not themselves "machinery" ; 96 making paper boxes is not the making of
"paper"; 97 manufacturing shoe uppers is not manufacturing of "shoes"; 9
and, in like manner, the production of clothing99 or umbrellas' 00 is not within
an exemption for manufacturers of "textile fabrics." On the other hand, a.
maker of sugaring equipment is exempt as a maker of "agricultural implements" (sugar being an agricultural product); 101 an ice cream plant was
held to be a "creamery," 102 and telephone poles103 as well as barrels 0 4 are
"articles" of wood."
The determination of these problems is largely a matter of factual
analysis, in which each case is sui generis. The solution, under the act, is.
90.' See GEORGIA CODE' A-,\-N. (1938) § 92-216, an enabling act passed pursuant to.
provisions of GA. CoxsT. ART. VII, § 2, par. 2-a [GA. CoDE AN. (1938) § 2-5003];.
LouISIANA CoxsT. of 1879, ART. 207, enumerating as exempt, manufacturers of textiles,.
leather, shoes, harness, saddlery, hats, flour, machinery, argricultural implements, ice,.
fertilizek , chemicals, furniture, soap, stationery, ink, paper, boats, and chocolate;
MrssIssIPPI CODE ANN. (1942) § 9703, as amended, enumerating over 40 categories,
ranging in products from coffins to automobiles and from golf clubs to tung oil, and in,
processes from canning to creosoting and from condensing milk to shelling pecans.
91, Pineland Bag. Corp. v. Riley,.142 Miss. 574, 107 So. 554 (1926).
92. Currie-Finch Brick Co. v. Miller, 123 Miss. 850, 86 So. 579 (1920), applying
the eiusde= generis rule. For similar administrative opinion as to the scope of this phrase,
see Reports of the Attorney General of Mississippi, 1907-09, pp. 44, 57, 343; 359, 380;
ibid. 1911'-13,.pp. 50, 199, 330.
93. Georgia Warehouse Co. v. folley, '172 Ga. 172, 157 S.E. 276 (1931).
94. Shreveport Gas, Electric Light & Power Co. v. Assessor, 47 La. Ann. 65, 16 So.
650 (1895); Crescent City Seltz and Mineral Water Co. v. New Orleans, 48 La. Ann..
768, 19 So. 943 (1896).
95. Atlas Feed Products Co. v. New Orleans, 113 La. 611, 37 So. 531 (1904).
96. Nicholson v. Board of Assessors, 48 La. Ann. 1570, 21 So. 167 (1896).
97. Washburn v. New Orleans, 43 La. Ann. 226, 9 So. 37 (1891).
98. Ricks v. Board of Assessors, 43 La. Ann. 1075, 10 So. 202 (1891).
99. Cohn v. Parker, 41 La. Ann. 894, 6 So. 718 (1889).
100. Lake Bros. v. Guillotte, 48 La. Ann. 870, 19 So. 924 (1896).
101. 'State cx rel. Fredericks v. Board of Assessors, 41 La. Ann. 534, 6 So. 337
(1889); Taylor Bros. Iron Works Co. v. New Orleans, 44 La. Ann. 554, .10 So. 3;
(1892).
102. Miller v.Pitts, 179 Ga.789, 177 S.E. 587 (1935).
103. Shreveport Creosoting Co. v. Shreveport, 119 La. 637, 44 So. 325 (1907).
104. New Orleans v. Le Blanc, 34 La. Ann. 596 (1882).
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left to the procedures of the administrative organization herein previously
described. This may avoid considerable litigation.
COMPARISON TO OTHER TAX EXEMPTION LAWS

Industrial tax exemptions in the United States are by no means a recent
development but date back to Colonial days.105 In 1789, th6-New Hampshire legislature enacted a statute exempting Eliplalet Hale's paper mill at
Exeter from taxation, 0 6 -while in 1808, and again in 1816, more generalized
industrial exemption laws were passed in the same state. 10 7 Between the
years 1805 and 1820, in New Hampshire alone, some sixty statutes granting
industrial exemptions' to specific individuals and corporations (generally as
part of the charter of incorporation) became law. 08
Historically, the greatest impetus to such legislation has come in postwar periods, 09 and in times of depression. 110 Geographically, tax exemption
has long been a weapon in the intersectional industrial rivalry between the
ilortheast and the South."'
Industrial tax exemptions vary greatly in degree and duration, in the
mature of the exempt classifications, and in the requirements for qualification.
A number of these lavs have 'been limited in application to only one or two
highly favored industries. Thus Alabama has a special ten year exemption
for calcium cyanamide (fertilizer) and aluminum plants;112 California
exempts various orchard trees and vineyards;1 13 Florida and elaware
-exempt motion picture tudios; 114 Iowa ,once favored the sugar beet in105, See WARE, THE EARLY NEW ENGLAND COTTON MANUFACTURE, 20 (1931);
IbVELL, TAXx oN IN NEW YORK STATE 194 (1918); Report of the Massachusetts
Cbmmissioner of Taxation, Taxation and Exemption Therefrom, 159 (1875) ; Stimson,
The Stimulation of Industry Through Tax Exemption, 1 THE TAX 'MAGAZINE, 169
,(1933).
106. 5 New Hampshire Laws 428 (1789).

107. 7 New Hampshire Laws 770 (1808); 8 New Hampshire Laws, 496 (1816).
108. So stated in Eyers Woolen Co. v. Gilsum, 84 N. H. 1; 19, 146 Atl. 511 (1929).
109. War of 1812: Maine, Laws 18-0-21, ch. 85; Maine, Public Acts 1825, ch. 288.
Civil War: LOUISIANA CONST. 1879, Art. 207; Maine, Acts and Resolves 1864, ch. 234.
.World War I: South Carolina, Acts 1924, p. 977, 1080; Arkansas, Acts 1927, p. 1209. See
Stimson, The Exemption, of Properly From Taxation in; the United Slates, 18 MINN. L.
413, 417 (1934).
110. Alabama, Laws Ex. Sess. 1936-37, p. 95-98; Delaware, Laws' 1937, ch. 44.
See Putney, Exemptions From Taxation, EDITORIAL RESEARCH REPORTS, Vol. 1-1941, p. 23,
-36 and Killough, Tax Exempt Industries in Rhode Island, 26 BULL. OF NATL. TAX AssN.,
.34, 48 ff. (1940).
111. Thus, out of 19 states granting some form of industrial tax exemption in 1934,
10 were in the South (Alabama, Arkansas, Georgia, Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi,
'Oklahoma, South Carolina, Tennessee, and Virginia) and 7 were from the Northeast
(Delaware, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island,
,and Vermont). Stimson, op. cit. supra n. 109.
112. CODE OF ALABAMA (1940), Title 51, § 10.
113.- CALIF. CoNsT. OF 1879, Art. XIII, § 12-/4 (adopted 1926).
114. FLORIDA CoxsT. OF 1885, Art. 9, § 14 (added in 1934); Delaware Laws 1937,
-ch. 44.
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dustry, n 6 as did Wyoming; 116 Wisconsin grants 'a thee year exemption
to zinc oxide producers; 117 Michigan once exempted salt manufacturing; 118
Oklahoma's only industrial exemption has been for cotton textile manufacturing,119 the same being true of Arkansas; 120 and New York formerly
assisted corporations engaged in foreign ocean commerce.12' 'Canada has had
a similar experience British Columbia exempted coal mines and coke ovens, 122
while Manitoba favored creameries and cheese'factories. 12 Since 1922, the
Federal Govdrnment has granted special tax exemptions to corporations
124
engaged in the China Trade.
In other jurisdictions, the industries designated to receive tax exemption
are more numerous. The classes enunieated may number only a few, as in
New Mexico, where beet sugar factories, broom factories, woolen mills,
smelters, cement and plaster plants, water power plants, and refining and reductions works were singled out. 1 2 4 * Or the list may cover nearly every conceivable
type of manufacturing, as is the case in Mississippi,125 and to a lesser degree,
in Louisiana. 26 Intermediate between these extremes, are the moderately
29
27
Georgia, 128 South Carolina,
extensive enumerations found in the Alabama,
and Florida 180 exemption laws. With the exception of the Mississippi statute,
115. IowA

CODE

ANN. 1913, § 1304a, Suplement (1913), p. 446 and Supplemental

Supplement p. 107-8 (1915).

WYOMING COMPILED STATS. ANNO. 1910, § 2321 (Fifth).
117. WISCONSIN STATs. 1945, § 70.11 (17).
118. Act of Feb. 15, 1859, quoted in East Saginaw Salt Mfg. Co. v. East Saginaw, 19
Mich. 259, 2 Am. Rep. 82 (1869).

116.

119. Okla. 'Session Laws 1915; ch. 195, § 1, enacted pursuant to

OKLA.

CONST. 1907,

Art. x, § 6.

120. ARx. CONST. oF 1874, Amendment 12, adopted 1926.
121. Baldwin's Consol. Laws of. N. Y. (1938), Tax 'Law, Art. I; § 4 (11).
122. BRITISH COLUMBIA, REV. ST..TS. (1911),'Vol. III, ch. 222, § 8 (33).
123. MANITOBA, REV. STATS. (1913) Vol. II, ch. 134, § 4.'
124. CHINESE TRADE Abr OF 1922, 42 STAT. 849, 15 U. S. CODE, chap: 4. (1922)124a. NEW MEXICO STATS. ANN. § 5429 (1915).
125. MISSISSIPPI CODE ANN,. § 9703 (1942) (as amended), described supra n. 90.
126. LA. CONST. OF 1879, Art. 207, described supra n. 90.
127. CODE-OF ALABAMIA (1940), Title 51, § 3, listing thread, textiles, clothing, aircraft,
shipbuilding, bags, wood pulp products, glass, ceramics, enamelware, farm implements, and
dairy products industries.
-128. GEORGIA CODE ANN. (1938) § 92-216, listing plants for "the manufacture of
processing of cotton, wool, linen, silk, rubber, clay, wood, metal, metallic or nonmetallic
minerals, or combinations of the same, cream or cheese plant, or for the production or

development of electricity .... "

129. SOUTH CAROLINA, CONST. OF 1895, ART. 8; § 8, par. 2 listing "furniture factories,
pulp and paper mills, and cigarette and tobacco factories of value above one hundred
thousand ($100,000.00) dollars. :." in two named counties, as being exempt. Als6, South
Carolina Code of Laws (1932) § 2597, enumerating as entitled to exemption, "all cotton,
yarn, hosiery, bleaching, woolen, rubber, pulp, paper, veneer, furniture, pottery and
chemical manufacturing establishments . ." in the county of Georgetown, of the value
of $100,000 or more. Industrial tax exemption in South Carolina has been characterized
by a hodge-podge of individual exemption statutes applicable only in named counties, with
a considerable variation in the type of plant and valuation requirements for exemption.
130. FLORIDA CONST. OF 1885, Art. 9, § 12 (added 1930) listing shipbuilding, tires,
textiles, wood pulp, paper, bags, fiber board, automobilies, aircraft, glass and crockery
industries, and the refining of sugar and oils.
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Act No. 346 of Puerto Rico is the most sweeping statute of this type found
on record.
The Puerto Rican act is not solely an "enumeration type" of statute.
It grants a blanket exemption to all industries producing articles of commerce not previously produced on the island. 13 In this respect, Act No. 346
is comparable to the numerous tax exemption statutes which, making no
enumeration, state their applicability in general to newly located "manufacturing establishments,' 32 or "to all persons, firms and corporations
engaged in the branches of manufacturing industry," ' 33 or simply to "manufacturing property." 134
Because it applies in terms to all truly new industries, as well as to
many 'already established on the island, the scope of Act No. 346 exceeds
that of any other industrial exemption statute found. The most significant
impact of the statute, however, lies in the fact that enterprises qualifying
will be exempt not only from all insular taxes, but also from all federal
taxation. 13 5 Thus, industrial concerns may obtain benefits not available
under any state tax exemption laws. 13 6
EFFECTIVENESS OF TAX EXEMPTIONS To ATTRACT INDUSTRY

There has been considerable controversy as to the effectiveness of tax
exemption laws in accomplishing their chief purpose: to influence the location of industry. One authority on the subject*has stated that: 131
131. Section 1.
132. KENTUCKY CONST. § 170; KENTUCKY REv. STATS. § 91.260 (1946); New Hampshire, Public Stats. and Session Laws, Supp. 1901-13, p. 94; New Hampshire, Public
Laws (Special Sess. 1927) ch. 136; Vermont Public Laws § 594 (1933).
133. Maryland, Laws of 1916, ch. 561; see also, ANxo. CODE OF MARYLAND (1939),
Art. 81 § 7(23), authorizing local exemption of machinery used in "manufacturing."
134. RHODE ISLAND, GEN. LAWs 1938, ch. 29, § 4.
135. ORGANIC AcT, 31 STAT. 78 (1900), 48 U. S. C. § 740; 39 STAT. 954 (1917),
48 U. S. C. § 734; INT. REv. CODE § 3360(c).
136. Notice should be taken of the fact that even in states which do not have statutory
tax exemption privileges, such exemptions, either in whole or in part, are frequently
granted by local government, either illegally, or by means of a subterfuge. See Lowry,
Municipal Subsidies to Industries in. Tennessee, 7 So. Ecox. J. No. 3 (1941), reprinted
in South Carolina Planning Board, Pamphlet No. 9, Is New Industry Tax Exemptio;
Effective? 26 (1943); Tax Policy League, Tax Exemptions, (symposium) 46 (1939) ;
Putney, Exemptions from Taxation, Editorial Research Reports, vol. 1-1941, p. 23, 36;
Conn. Commission on Tax Exemptions, Report, 44 (1925).
Some common practices along these lines are:
(1) under-assessment of industrial property: see survey by S. C. Planning Bd., op. cit.,
pp. 15 (Georgia) and 17 (Pennsylvania); Natl. Ind. Conf. Bd., State and Local Taxation of Business Corporations,97 (1931) ; Corbin, Taxation of Mercantile and ManuJacturing Corporations, PROCEEDINGS OF NATL. TAx AssN. 309 et seq, (1909).
(2) offering of free factory sites: This practice has apparently been significant in
Michigan (S. C. Planning Bd., op. cit., p. 17) and California (ibid. p. 16).
(3) Leasing of publicly owned factory buildings to private industry at nominal rentals:
:see 54 American City 95 (April 1939), describing such practices in Hazelton, Pa. and
Natchez, Miss. In the latter case, the rental for a tire factory built and leased by the
-city was $50 per month.

137. Stimson, The Exemption of Property from Taxation in the United States, 18

XlINN. L. REv. 413, 424 (1934), Accord, Martin, The Social Aspects of Tax Exemption,
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"There is no evidence that this purpose is accomplished. A comparison of industrial growth, measured by the increase in value of manufactured products and
in income reported by industrial corporations, in states granting such exemptions
and in similarly situated states not granting them indicates that exemptions have
not modified industrial development. It is fairly certain that other factors, such as
location of raw materials and markets, character of the labor supply, availability
of capital, and transportation facilities, are much more fundamental than tax
exemption in determining the location of industrial enterprises."
It has been pointed out

3s

that a generalized statement of this sort is

of scant validity because of the scarcity of comparable data from the various
states. In the only thorough comparative statistical study of the problem yet
made, 39 the conclusion was that:
"There is no question but that industries might move from one state to another
if the tax differential were sufficiently large. This would be particularly true
of marginal firms located in unfavorable sections. But in the nine states selected for
this study the tax differentials were not large enough to force industrial relocation,"

The South Carolina State Planning Board published a few years ago a
report of a survey made in that 'state. On fhe basis of questionnaires sent
to county treasurers, it was "the considered and collective opinion of the
majority of the counties that tax exemptions do not have a controlling influence in locating industry." 140 In a: survey of new industries locating in South
Carolina since 1940, the Board found that location of raw materials, availability of local markets, adequacy of labor supply, and presence of good
transportation were deemed more important considerations than exemption
from taxation.' 4 ' Such exemptions were welcomed in every case, but, says
the Board, "In no case known to us was any industry on this list of new
plants located primarily because of local tax exemption."
In a similar survey by questionnaires sent to eighteen different state
183 ANNALS OF THE AamER. AcAD. OF POL. & SOC. SCIENcE 48, 52 (1936), citing on this
point, Report of the Special Committee on Taxation and Debt in Florida, 82 (1935) and
LuTz, THE GEORGIA SySTE=

OF REVENUE 41.

138. Cordner, State Tax Burdens as an Influence on the Location of Industry, 19
TAXES 537, 538 et seq. (1941).
139. Steiner, The Tax System and Industrial Development, 35 UNIV. OF ILL. BuLL.

No. 58, 46 (1938). The states covered by this analysis were Illinois, Indiana, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin, none of
which have a general industrial tax exemption statute.
140. South Carolina Planning Board, Pamphlet No. 9, Is New Industry Tax Exemption Effective?, 8 (1943). The significance of this conclusion is minimized "by the
fact, that as between counties, there is no substantial differential in tax savings since
all but three of the 46 counties in the state grant a five-year exemption to new industry.
See editorial in The Columbia Record, Aug. 3, 1942, and S. C. Planning Bd., Pamphlet
No. 6, The Woolen and Worsted Industry in South Carolina (1942).
141. S. C. Planning Bd., Pamphlet No. 9, Is New Industry Tax Exemption Effective?
13 (1943). Similar conclusions were reached in SToxs, CARPETBAGGERS OF INDUSTRY
(1935), quoted in S. C. Planning Bd., op. cit. p. 24, and in Metrop. Life Ins. Co.
Policyholders Service Bu. and Natl. Elec. Light Assn. Civic Dev. Com., Industrial
Development in the United States and Canada, 1926 and 1927 (no date), quoted in
ibid, p. 23. See also, in accord, HoLMEs, PLANT LocATIox (1930).
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taxing authorities, the Board found only one state, Louisiana, which felt that
tax exemption had been a successful inducement to industrial Ioc1tion.142
Alabama, Mississippi, Arkansas, and Oklahoma thought other factors were
more important, while the answers given by Tennessee, Connecticut, and
Virginia impliedly admitted the effectiveness of tax exemption, but were opposed to it on other grounds. 4 3 The remaining ten states either had no experience with industrial tax exemption or expressed no opinion as to its ef144
fectiveness.
Surveys of a generalized nature, such as the foregoing, must of necessity
be inconclusive. Immunity from taxation is but one of many factors involved
in attempts to cut costs of production, including the major items of interest,
labor, materials, power and transportation. 145 The influence of the various
factors will vary from one industry to another as well as from firm to firm.140
The effectiveness of tax exemption thus depends upon whether the element
of taxes bulks relatively large in the analysis of alternative cost structures in
contemplated localities. Unless the possible savings through tax exeftption appear to be quite substantial, certain intangible factors, such as the attitude of
government toward business,, climate, recreational facilities, or considerations
of intracorporate coordination and concentration, will often prevail. 47
142. "It is an inescapable fact that during the existence of the tax exemption law,
Louisiana experienced the greatest industrial expansion in its history." Quoted from Report
of the Bd. of Dir. of the Dept. of Commerce and Industry of La., May 1, 1942,
in S. C. Planning Bd., op. cit. supra n. 141, p. 16. See also, Mass. Commission on Interstate Cooperation, Final Report Concerning Migration of Industrial Establishments From
Massachusetts, (1939) reprinted in ibid., p. 30 et seq. This Massachusetts body felt that
although tax differentials were not "an important factor" in the widespread industrial
migration from the state, they did have "some bearing." And it was recognized that
establishments getting tax exemptions in the South "have a distinct advantage" over
those in Massachusetts and elsewhere not getting exemptions.
143. Tennessee: "From the standpoint of inducement, tax exemption does not work.
lit serves as an inducement only for the period for which the exemption applies and ex;perience shows that many of these plants leave the community as soon as the exemption
period expires." op. cit. p. 15.
Connecticut: "We have learned through sad experience that the concerns which are
:attracted to a state or community through special inducements are not particularly
desirable." op. cit. p. 17.
Virginia: "The cities experienced in tax exemption are not convinced that tie
practice is beneficial in the long run." op. cit. p. 14.
144. These states were: Maryland, North Carolina, Kentucky, Georgia, Florida,
California, Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri, and Pennsylvania.
145. Stimson, The Stimulation of Industry Through Tax Exemption, 11 THE TAX
MAGAZINE 221, 225 (1933) : "The immunity from taxation,' to be effective, must be of
sufficient value to the manufacturer to offset any disadvantages that might exist in the
way of distance to raw materials, labor supply, and selling market."
146. See Cordner, op. cit. supra n. 138, p. 604 et seq., and Martin, Effects of Taxation
on Industrial Development With Special Reference to the South, reprinted from 20
SouTLWESTaN SOCIAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY (1940) in S. C. Planning Bd., op. cit. supra
n. 141, p. 3.
147. Killough, TaxExempt IndustriesinRhode Island, 26 BULL. or NATL. TAx AWss'q.
34, 44 (1940). See S. C. Planning Bd., op. cit. supra n. 141, p. 23, listing eleven factors
more important than tax advantages as a reason for location of plants: Markets, Labor,
Transportation, Materials, Availability of factory buildings, Personal reasons, Power
and fuel, Cheap rent, Nearness to related industries, Living conditions, and Financial aid.
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In evaluating Act No. 346 the previously discussed experience of' the
states, (most of which were Southern) is of little weight. In the first place,
property taxes. (which constitute-the main source of revenue for state, county,
and municipal government) 148 are usually rather low in the South. 4 9 Savings through tax exemption would therefore generally not be large. Secondly,
"although the amnount of tax load is a material, even though comparatively
minor cost factor, the difference in the amount as bet:veen one state and another is rarely as important as variations in other expenses-notably labor,
power, transportation, marketing, and rental costs." 150
Neither of these considerations apply to the Puerto Rican exemptionlaw. Under it, qualified indiistries are exempt from botth insular and federal
taxation. The extenf of these savings will vary considerably from industry to
industry, 16 ' and from firm to firm, and must be balanced as against other
possibly disadvantageous cost factors. But it is to be expected that this unique
twofold immunity will create much more substantial savings than is possible
in the states. Attention should also be directed toward abundance of comparatively low-wage labor, in Puert6 Rico, 52 a factor which, together with
148. NatL Ind. Conf. Bd., Research Report No. 64, Tax Burdens and Exemptions,
59 (1923) ; Woodworth, Importance of Property Tax itState and Local Tax Systems,
in TAX PoLicy LEAGUE, Property taxes (symposium), ch. 1 (1940); Comment, .idicial
Restoration of the General Property Tax Base, 44 YALE L. J.1075 (1935).
149. Roesken, Tax Tremdts in the Southern States, 24 TAXES 323, 326 (1946).
150. Martin, op. cit. supra n. 146, pp. 3-4; see also, Steiner, op. cit. supra n. 139,
p. 46.
151. From 1931-1939, federal corporate income taxes averaged 21. 9% of income
less deficit before taxes of manufacturing corporations. Among product classifications,
the percentage ranged from a high of 91.6% for textile manufacturing to a low of 13.9%
for tobacco manufacturing. Natl. Ind. Conf. Bd., Effects of Taxes Upon Corporate
Policy, 24 (1943).
152. See note 15 supra. In July, 1945, approximately 11% of the labor force of Puerto,
Rico was unemployed (i.e. 72,300 unemployed out of a total labor force of 675,000).
DESCARTES, BASIC STATISTICS ON PUERTO Rico 61 (1946).

Average wage rates of industrial workers in Puerto Rico, as found in Annual Reports.
of the Puerto Rican Dept. of Labor, for the following years were:
1936-37
1937-38
1938-39

13.4 per hour
15.7 per hour
19.3 per hour

1939-40
1940-41
1941-42

20.90 per hour
22.6 per -hour
25.1 per hour

1942-43

28.0 per hour

The passage of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 52 STAT. 1062 (1938), caused
great consternation in Pueko Rico, particularly in the needlework, sugar, and tobacco,
industries, where the prevailing wage scale was far below the statutory minimum. See
Puerto Rico Dept. of Labor, Annual Report 1938-39, p. 33. Many employers in the needlework industry- threatened to move their businesses to China and the Philippines, "where
conditions, as they claimed, were better for them to do business on account of the meager
wages paid to the workers." (ibid. 1940-41, p. 11).
But on June 26, 1940, the President approved an amendment to the F. L. S. A.
empowering the Wage and Hour Administrator to appoint special committees to adjust
wage rates in Puerto Rico (54 STAT. 615 f 1940). A Committee was duly appointed on
August 1, 1940, which proceeded to hold hearings, and on the basis thereof, minimum
wage rates were recommended and approved by the Administrator, ranging from 12.5 cents
per hour to 25 cents Per hour. (ibid. 1940-41, p..10). Thus the wage differential existingbetween the mainland and the Island was perpetuated under the Fair Labor Standards
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the broad tax exemption, may well stimulate a large influx of industry to the
island. 153
There can be little doubt that tax exemption advantages have been
primarily responsible for the choice of location of many individual plants in
154
the past.
Thus, in some places, and to some extent at least, it would seem that the
purpose behind tax exemption laws has been realized.
ULTIMATE EFFECT ON THE EcONOMY

One must remember, however, that there is a secondary purpose to such
exemption as this. It is contemplated that, after the relatively short period
of tax exemption has expired, the industries attracted thereby will be well
-established. The termination of the exemption is expected to broaden the tax
,base by the amount of the previous exemption. Thereby, it is hoped to make
.Act. The presently prevailing statutory minimum wages in various industries in Puerto
Rico are listed in Office of Information for Puerto Rico, Puerto Rico Handbook, 32
,(1947).
153. In Tennessee, where a comparable combination of local tax exemption policies
:and abundant low-wage labor existed in the recent great depression, it was found in 1937
that, out of 35 new industries established since 1930 in towns of less than 10,000 population, 31 were being subsidized by tax exemption or its equivalent. "A large' proportion of
-factories in the smaller towns were brought in since January, 1930, indicating a remarkable
accleration of small-town industrialization... Low-wage garment and shoe manufacturers
-of outside origin accounted for most of the increase in the number of factory units established since January, 1930, and nearly all were subsidized. The data do not indicate,
however, whether the garment and shoe industries were being attracted by the special
inducements or were merely accepting them as incidental to larger consideration of plant
location-such as labor supply or relative wage levels." Lowry, op. cit. supra n. 136, p.
28-29.
The significance of the dual nature of the Puerto Rican tax exemption is increased
-when reference is made to the tremendous development in federal tax revenues in recent
_years. From 1939 to 1944, for example, federal internal revenues rose from 5.2 billions to
40.8 billions, while state and local tax revenues rose only from 7.9 billions to 9.7 billions.
Blakely, Post War Ta.x Problems, 17 STAT GOVERNMENT 422 (1944). While this growth

-was admittedly abnormal, due to the war emergency, recent developments at home and
.abroad lend additional authenticity to the statement of Mr. Blakely, President of
:the National Tax Assn., that "The prospect is that individuals and businesses will have
very high taxes isfar ahead as we can see." (ibid. p. 422).
154. See sources cited supra n. 142-143; Conn. Commission on Tax Exemptions,
iReport, 34 et. seq. (1925) ; Stimson, op. cit. supra n. 145, p. 223, reporting that as late
as 1930, there was over one million dollars worth of exempt industrial property in Conmecticut, despite the known illegality of such exemptions; New Hampshire State Tax
iCommission, Report, 7 f. (1913), and ibid. 13 f. (1914).
Killough, Tax Exempt Industries in Rhode Island, 26 BULL. OF NATL. TAX Ass's.
-34 (1940), gives several examples of plants locating as the result of tax exemption
inducements. Apparently, the author finds the inducement was greatest for plants making
:shoelaces, buttons, ribbons and similar small items. As for the woolen textile industry, the
:author states, at p. 45, "Apparently more than 90 per cent of the factories employing more
than 90 per cent of the workers in the woolen and worsted industry in Rhode Island had
located there without the inducement of tax ecemption. It was probably true, nevertheless,
that tax exemption was responsible for the location of some woolen and worsted
factories in particular towns and cities."
For cases where it was alleged that the tax exemption was the reason for the
location of the plant, see Crafts v. Ray, 22 R. I. 179, 46 Atl. 1043 (1900), and East
Saginaw Salt Mfg. Co. v. East Saginaw, 19 Mich. 259, 2 Am. Rep. 82 (1869).
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a general reduction in tax rates as the previously exempt industries begin to
share in paying for the cost of government. 155
In justification of tax exemption policies, it is usually argued that lax
administration of property taxes in many localities has removed the principle
of equality from public consciousness, thus tending to make tax exemptions
the usual and accepted practice. 156 This argument is one of political expediency; and it finds additional support in the "argument that no appropriations are necessary, as would be the case if a direct subsidy were employed.
The policy will be expedient politically to the extent that it gets results that
the electorate wants without excessive costs or corresponding disadvantages
that the electorate does not want.
One authority says that "No form of tax concession has received such
universal condemnation from tax experts as the exemption of industrial
properties from taxation." 157 First, tax exemption is said to be -a form of
economic warfare between states (and,'one may add,-between nations 158)
which weakens the economic structure of the participants. 15 9 Its adoption by
one state tends to encourage similar action by neighboring states hence eliminating the advantages received by any community without, eliminating the
disadvantage undergone by it.160
Second, it is argued that tax exemption tends to encourage industry on
the shaky basis of lower tax costs, rather than on the Airm footing of permanent economic savings.161 This is often true where no investigation is made
beforehand of possible benefits and burdens, 62 and where exemptions are
liberally extended to all applicants regardless of the permanence or stability
155. See Crafts v. Ray, snpra n. 154, and quotation therefrom, supra p. 12-13 and the

quotation from Colton v. Montpelier, 71 Vt. 413 (1899), supra p. 27.
156. Lowry, op. cit. supra n. 136, p. 27.
157. Putney, op. cit. supra n. 136, p. 36. See also, Adams, Taxation in Maryland,
in JoHN-s HoPKINs STUDIES IN STATE TAXATION, 70 (1900), where industrial tax
exemption is characterized as a "palpable mistake."

158. Mexico has a five year-new industry exemption: Presidential Decree approved
Dec. 30, 1939, 118 Diario Oficial de Mexico No. 40 (1940), described in 74 B1ll. of
Pan Amer. Union 661 (1940). See also, 74 id. 788, describing an import tax exemption
by Ecuador for certain industrial imports, in order to stimulate home production.
159. Kenneth 1. McCarren, vice-president of the Detroit Board of Assessors, in
TAx PoLIcy LEAGUE, Tax Exemptions (symposium), ch. III (1939).
160. See the statement by McCarren, loc. cit. supra n. 159: "The. most serious aspect
of these subsidies rests mnthe fact that there is no logical end. The granting of subsidies by one community eventually impels other communities to grant similiar or larger

subsidies, almost as measures of self-protection. Such a policy, if continued over a long

enough period of time, should logically end in complete exemption of all industrial
enterprises, with disastrous effects on our whole national economy." Accord, Miller,
Attracthig Industry Through Tax Exemption, 10 MUxIcIrAL FINANCE, NO. 3, 23 (Feb.
1938).
161. McCarren, op. cit. supra n. 159.
162. The Virginia exemption law, TAx CoDE 1930, p. 2255, is unique in that it
requires the local governing body to find, pre-requisite to granting of'.an exemption, that
the loss in revenue will be more than compensated by the establishment of the new
industry.
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of -the enterprise. Tax exemption laws have sometimes encouraged "fly-bynight" industries which:
"would gain all the benefits of an organized community without adequate payment
for minicipal service rendered, and would commercialize a gesture oilthe part
of a misguided legislature, which contemplated building up a cofamunity 'of
permanence and stability, with the prospect of the eventual payment of taxes after
the 'peiod of exemption had expired.163

Even where 'the plant Ji§ established locally in good faith, but upon the
economically uqsound"basis of temporary tax savings, it may find it necessary
to shut down pr. move elsewhere after the period of exemption has expired.
If they do not leave, opponents of tax exemption legislation claim that:
.'tbere is no way they can possibly avoid payment of the taxes for the period
'ior which they were supposedly exempt. The reason for this is that thd expense
incurred in providing community services for the firm have been reflected in the
city's debt structure or assessed valuation to the point where the industry will
.have to pay anyway."1 64

This logic would apply to a one-industry town but probably has little relevancy
to the discussion of the Puerto Rican statute. Taxable property and income
in Puerto Rico is already substantial and the incidence of any increase would
be widespread.
Furthermore, this result will not be detrimental to "infant industries"
which, although founded on a sound economic basis, require assistance in
their initial years of operation. But it has been pointed out that some industries never outgrow their stage of "infancy"; 165 and that it is an extremely
difficult task to determine beforehand which industries will be able to mature
sufficiently to weather the storms of competition after the exemption period
166
has expired.
Third, even though the beneficiary industry does not move elsewhere
at the end of the exemption period, the cost to the community can still be a
'high 0ne.167 A careful investigator in Rhode Island found that:
"When tax exemption brings nev concerns, new buildings and new workers
into a growing community it is directly responsible for a growth in community
163. Miller,-'p. cit. suPra n. 160, p. 25.
164. South Carolina Planning Bd., op. cit. supra n. 141, p. 15.
165..Conn. Commission on Tax Exemption, Report, 34-47 (1925); Stimson, The

Stimulation 'of Ai dustry Through Tax Exemption, 11 THE TAX MAGAZINE 221, 222
(1933).

166. Stimson, op. cit. supra n. 165, p. 222.

167. A most graphic illustration is offered by Stimson, Exemption From Propert,
Tax in California, 21 CAI.m. L., REv. 193 (1933) where, at p. 204, n. 47, the following
passage is quoted from the San Francisco Alto of Oct. 5, 1869: "The mines were
exempted from taxation 'when they were in the most luxuriant condition, and when a
burden that is. now oppressive would scarcely have been felt, Thus it is that counties
with poor buildings, few good public wagon roads, no railroads, and in fact, with no
property worthy of notice, are overwhelmed with debt."
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costs. It is highly probable that the costs of the local government will increase more

rapidly than the population. Even if the new concerns prosper and, -at the end
of the exemption period, begin to pay taxes it may be a long time before they
compensate the community for the expenses they have caused."168

During the period of exemption, these increased costs of governmental
services must be met to a large extent by established industry, a result which
is sometimes considered unfair especially where the subsidized industry is
directly or indirectly competitive. 6 9 The Connecticut experience was that,
"while such concerns may temporarily add to a community's payroll, they
often contribute to the community's relief-load---especially in poor times." 170
Again it may be questioned whether these effects that are experienced when
tax exemption attracts new industries and new workers to a town will appear
where, as in Puerto Rico, the potential labor force is already resident within
the taxing jurisdictions.
And, lastly, the experience in Tennessee cities has shown that after factories have been obtained, and the community economy has been. shapb d to
." '
them,
"it appears inescapable that factories or their equivalent in terms of employment
and pay roll must be retained to avoid serious social and economic consequences.
In order to hold the low-wage factories against labor costs that have been rising
since the factories were brought in, the communities may find that subsidies must
be continued or even increased." 171
Taxation authorities who oppose such laws seem to agree that "equitable
laws, fair play in taxation, and the elimination of restrictions affecting industrial plants will bring to any state its full quota of industries without the
subsidy of tax exemption." 172 Yet the failure of other methods of inducing
industry to locate in Puerto Rico173 has led to the present board experiment
in .tax exemption. The success of this legislation bids fair to be in keeping
with the unprecedented scope of the exemption granted. Immunity from all
federal as well as insular taxes, combined with the plentiful lower-wage labor of Puerto Rico, would seem to constitute a most compelling inducement
for the establishing of industry there.
168. Killough, Tax Exempt Industriesin Rhode Island, 26 BULL. OF NATL. TAX AssN.
34, 50 (1940).
169. McCarren, op. cit. supra n. 159; Killough, op. cit. supra n. 168, p. 49; Tax
Policy League, Tax Exemptions (symposium) 19 (1939).
170. S. C. Planning Bd., op. cit. supra n. 141, p. 17. In substantial agreement, see
Rhode Island experience in Killough, op. cit. supra n. 168, p. 48 et seq.
171. Lowry, op. cit. supra n. 136, p. 29. Evidence in support of this statement may
be found in the statistics compiled by Mr. Lowry, ibid. p. 28, which indicate that out

of 31 factories in the smaller cities of Tennessee (under 10,000 population), 17 were still

receiving tax exemption privileges after more than seven years of operation, despite the
fact that five years is the regular exemption period.

172. Miller, op. cit. n. 160, p. 23.

173. See remarks of Puerto Rican Commissioner of Labor, quoted supra n. 15, and
sources cited supra n.18-19. But cf. Brief of the Government of Puerto Rico, presented

to the Committee for Reciprocity Information, Wash., D. C. 57-63 (1947).
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. With. direct subsidies legally impossible, little can be done b9 mainland
c6mmunities to" iatch the Puerto Rican exemption; it includes immunity
from all federal taxation, a benefit not within the power of the states to grant.
Of course, to the extent that industry does migrate from the states to this new
area of tax imfaunity, federal revenues will also be diminished. As these effects are more sharply discerned, the combined pressure of adversely affected
grqups may well be expressed as a demand for -federal legislation to remove
the industrial tax differential now existing in 'Puerto Rico's favor, Th
strength of this -demand will depend upon the extent to which the developniet of industry in Puerto Rico which the act brings to pass is achieved at
the expense of:mnainland areas.
. Regardless of whether such controversies materialize, the Puerto Rico
experiment will certainly provide measurable criteria that have never existed
before for evaluating the wisdom of a policy of industrial tax exemption.
Puerto Mco Dept. of Agric. and Commerce, Puerto Rico Industrial and Commercial
(1941) is a good*example of a well illustrated and written informational bulletin designed
to inform potential entrepreneurs of insular advantages. On p. 2 is an imposing statement
entitled, "Nineteen Good Reasons for Establishing Factories .or New Industries in
Puerto Rico."

